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ABSTRACT
THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CREATION OF A
FISSURED WORKPLACE: THE CASE OF
FRANCHISING
SEPTEMBER 2019
BRIAN CALLACI
B.A., FRANKLIN & MARSHALL COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Carol E. Heim
This dissertation explores the consequences of institutional change in capitalist
firms, focusing on vertical dis-integration, the legal boundaries of the firm and what
David Weil has called workplace “fissuring,” in which corporations place intermedi-
aries (subcontractors, temp agencies, or franchisees) between themselves and workers,
often with negative consequences for workers. It focuses specifically on franchising, a
type of fissured workplace in which one firm outsources retail operations to smaller,
legally independent franchisees. The first chapter uses archival sources to identify
the legal and policy changes driving workplace fissuring in the franchising context:
specifically the relaxing of antitrust prohibitions on vertical restraints (contractual
controls on separate firms, such as price and supplier restrictions). These contractual
mechanisms, which allow chains to achieve uniformity and control over their outlets
vii
without directly owning them, helped create fissured workplaces in the case of fran-
chising. I show that franchising firms waged a struggle in courts and legislatures to
expand their ability to impose vertical restraints, pulling in the legal boundaries of
the firm and leaving workers outside.
With a formal model emphasizing the two-level principal-agent problem in fran-
chising (between franchisors and franchisees, and franchisees and workers), the sec-
ond chapter shows that franchise brands can induce very high levels of franchisee
effort by leveraging product market power and one-sided contract terms to reduce
the franchisee’s bargaining position. Franchising in this context functions as a type
of surveillance and labor discipline organizational technology, in which franchise con-
tracts induce franchisees to surveil production workers and extract high levels of effort
from them, reducing the investments in monitoring and/or efficiency wages that fran-
chisors would otherwise have to make.
The third chapter exploits a new, hand-collected data set from 530 franchise con-
tracts, to link, to my knowledge for the first time, vertical restraints to workforce
characteristics. It uncovers an empirical relationship between contingent, relatively
unskilled and low-wage workforces and the likelihood of franchisors imposing vertical
restraints. I argue that franchisors impose vertical restraints to target a vulnerable
and cheap workforce. By removing alternative profit-making strategies from the fran-
chisees’ decision set, these restraints incentivize franchisees to focus on minimizing
labor costs and extracting effort from workers for their profit margins.
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INTRODUCTION
American businesses today are smaller, leaner, and more flexible than the giant,
vertically integrated corporations of the mid-twentieth-century era. While General
Motors employed over 600,000 workers at its peak in 1979 and handled design, parts
manufacturing, and assembly in-house, today it employs 200,000 and contracts for
virtually everything but the design and assembly of its automobiles. Perhaps the
most iconic American brand, McDonald’s, today employs only 90,000 of the 840,000
people who work at its restaurants, outsourcing the actual operation of the bulk of
its core food service operations to a network of thousands of legally independent fran-
chisees. Economists and economic historians have largely focused on the efficiency
aspects of this process. According to this story, in some cases, as communications and
transportation technologies reduced the costs of relying on decentralized markets to
organize production, firms responded by scaling back their use of internal, centrally
planned hierarchies in favor of contracting in the market (Lamoreaux et al. 2003;
Williamson 1985). In other cases firms took advantage of the superior incentives of
residual claimancy for solving principal-agent problems and switched from employ-
ment relationships inside the firm to independent contractor relationships outside
the firm (Rubin 1978; Mathewson and Winter 1985). In all cases, firms primarily re-
sponded to exogenous technological changes and adopted more efficient organizational
techniques.
Technological change certainly played a role in vertical dis-integration. But the
differential legal and regulatory treatment of activities taking place inside vs. out-
side the formal boundaries of the firm also contributed to the shift to dis-integrated
organizational structures. While the economic boundaries of the firm correspond to
1
the extent of centrally planned and hierarchically coordinated production, the legal
boundaries are set in politically contested legislatures and courts. Exploiting or cre-
ating mismatches between the two has enabled corporations to enjoy the economic
benefits of vertical integration while avoiding many of the legal risks and costs. Fran-
chising is a large and important type of vertical dis-integration. The three chapters
of this dissertation examine the historical process by which franchising was created,
the advantages franchisors achieved by innovating this new business form, and the
consequences for workers and other stakeholders.
2
CHAPTER 1
CONTROL WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: THE LEGAL
CREATION OF FRANCHISING 1960-1980
The first capitalist firms to reach large size in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century did so through the mechanism of vertical integration—formal ownership
of assets and employment of workers. In the 1950s a group of entrepreneurs, concen-
trated especially in the emerging industry of fast food, pioneered a different route to
bigness. This new path deployed highly restrictive franchise contracts rather than for-
mal property ownership and employment relationships to bind subordinate units into
coherent, centrally controlled business organizations. Under franchise contracts, a
large franchisor like McDonald’s, rather than owning and operating its retail business
operations, licensed legally independent franchisees to do so. Franchisees typically
paid a percentage of their sales to the franchisor and signed long-term contracts that
gave franchisors substantial control of unit operations.1 In 2012, the most recent year
for which data are available, franchising firms accounted for 7.9 million jobs in the
United States, compared to 13.4 million jobs in manufacturing. Franchisors accounted
for more than 450,000 establishments, 10.45 percent of all establishments. Sales of
franchised chains were about 1.3 trillion dollars in 2007, or 9.2 percent of total U.S.
GDP (Kosova´ and Lafontaine 2012).
1The term “franchising” is sometimes also used to refer to exclusive dealing relationships between
manufacturers and distributors. In this paper I use “product distribution franchising” to refer to
this kind of exclusive dealing arrangement, and “business format franchising” to refer to the type of
franchising where a franchisor licenses a franchisee to operate a busines concept under a trademark.
Since business format franchising is the focus of this dissertation, the term “franchising” when used
alone refers to business format franchising.
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The economic history and business history literature on franchising is surpris-
ingly thin.2 This chapter begins to deepen that history by delving into the concrete
struggles franchisors undertook to establish their unique business form. On one hand,
franchisors fought against broad antitrust prohibitions on vertical restraints—controls
on legally separate firms like price, supplier and customer restrictions. Their eventual
victory on this front allowed them to follow an alternative path to giant size differ-
ent from that pursued by the vertically integrated firms of the nineteenth and early
twentieth century. On the other hand, they persuaded courts and a wide range of
regulators that, despite tight control exercised through vertical restraints, franchised
chains should not be considered single organizations under labor, tax and other laws.
Rather, franchised chains should be understood under these laws as loose constel-
lations of dozens, hundreds or thousands of legally separate organizations, with the
central franchisor not ultimately responsible or liable for activity at any of the indi-
vidual branches.
Franchising thus in a sense redefined the legal boundaries of the firm. What did
franchisees gain by pulling in the legal boundaries of the firm? As Nelson Lichtenstein
(2017) has argued, twentieth-century policymakers created the regulatory law holding
firms accountable for the activity they oversaw and controlled with the archetype of
the large vertically integrated firm in mind. This meant that they tied legal respon-
sibility and accountability to the formal characteristics of vertical integration: the
ownership of assets and employment of workers. While Progessive and New Deal-era
regulation worked reasonably well for as long as the relevant economic activity took
2Several profiles of successful franchisors have been published, including Love (1995) and Shook
and Shook (1993). Luxenberg (1986) is a (highly critical) journalistic account of the history of
franchising. However, Dicke (1992) is to my knowledge the only scholarly history of this business
form. Through case studies of five firms from 1840 to 1980, he explores the business form’s history
by a comparative analysis of the challenges faced by representative franchisors in five industries.
Blair and Lafontaine (2010) provide a good overview of the main legal and economic issues involved
in franchising.
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place within the legal boundaries of such firms, subsequent vertical dis-integration
undermined the ability of the public to subject corporations to social control. For
example, vertical dis-integration created what David Weil (2014) has called “fissured
workplaces,” in which the legal boundaries of the firm acted as barriers excluding
workers outside it from gaining access to higher wages paid by large firms, internal
career ladders, and legal protections (whose coverage remains largely limited to the
firm in which the worker has formal employee status). Tomaskovic-Devey (2014)
similarly argues that vertical dis-integration contributes to inequality by excluding
workers from “organizational citizenship” and the ability to make claims on the re-
sources of the firm.
In litigating and lobbying to pull in the legal boundaries of the firm, franchisors
pursuing vertical dis-integration ironically followed in the footsteps of the nineteenth-
century manufacturers that created the first vertically integrated large industrial
firms. Most economic studies of vertical integration, dis-integration and franchis-
ing emphasize technological changes or efficiency considerations as driving changes
in vertical industrial organization (Williamson 1985; Lamoreaux et al. 2003; Blair
and Lafontaine 2010). However, far from merely responding to technological changes
making mass production possible, the first vertically integrated large manufacturing
firms actually created, through lobbying and litigation, the very national U.S. market
that made it profitable for them to invest in those mass-production technologies in the
first place (McCurdy 1978). Similarly, twentieth-century franchisors, with help from
increasingly sympathetic antitrust policymakers, the dynamic Law and Economics
movement, and somnolent labor law, used lobbying and litigation to transform an
innovative legal structure of fragile legality into an accepted staple of American busi-
ness.
Franchising allowed firms to escape the legal and regulatory costs and risks that
constrained vertically integrated corporations of the earlier era, and many contempo-
5
rary observers therefore felt that franchisors were unfairly avoiding the law. Donald
Conley, the first franchising vice president for McDonald’s, who left that position to
become a franchisee, testified that “the franchise relationship is so sophisticated that
it is not presently regulated by any traditional state or federal law, and has basically
become a vehicle for getting around traditional law” (Committee on Commerce 1976,
390-391). Franchisors had to persuade regulators, legislators, and courts that their
business form was new, unique and valuable, and should not be regulated according
to existing conceptions of legal relationships.
Franchisors relied on their trade association, the International Franchise Associ-
ation (IFA), as their main public voice and lobbying vehicle. It has remained the
official voice of franchisors from its founding in 1960, as franchisors have grown into
some of the largest corporations in the United States. The IFA is the only consistent
presence across the two decades of public hearings, litigation, and legislative action
over the years 1960-1980. While opponents of the IFA, in particular the various short-
lived franchisee associations, appear in the public record one year and disappear the
next, the IFA is still active today. Its activities have included lobbying, filing am-
icus briefs, engaging in public relations, mobilizing its members to lobby state and
federal legislators and agencies and, starting in 1978, becoming one of the early busi-
ness associations founding a Political Action Committee (PAC). As one journalist
reported,“the IFA in its own limited area is an unchallenged force”(Luxenberg 1986,
243).
1.1 Vertical restraints: an alternative route to bigness
According to a study commissioned by the Small Business Administration in 1963,
“[t]he legal status of franchising is the dominant problem affecting the future of this
method of distribution” (Lewis and Hancock 1963, 72). To put it bluntly, franchising
as we know it in 2018 was not legal in the 1960s. The history of the creation of
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franchising is in large part the story of the loosening of antitrust restrictions on
what are known as vertical restraints. These contractual controls on independent
franchisees, such as price, supplier, and customer restrictions, were the mechanisms
franchisors relied on to create the uniform chain-store appearance of their far-flung
operations in the absence of formal vertical integration. Without vertical restraints,
franchisors would have been forced to directly own and operate outlets to achieve
similar levels of chain store uniformity.
In important ways, however, franchising represented an alternative path to cen-
tralized vertical control rather than true vertical dis-integration,. Franchising firms
like Burger King sought to tightly control their production networks, setting prices,
products, suppliers, menus, recipes and hours of operation, dictating everything from
the process for making french fries to the manner in which employees greeted cus-
tomers. They aimed to achieve this, however, without taking title to productive
assets or employing workers. As Earl Pollock, a former Antitrust Division attorney
and then-Chairman of antitrust programs for the American Bar Association, put it
in 1973, “integration by contract is a substitute for integration by ownership” (In-
ternational Franchise Association 1973, 49). From this perspective, franchising was
vertical integration by other means.
The minute control franchisors sought to impose on franchisees could be intense.
As Ray Kroc, the founder of franchisor par excellence McDonald’s, put it, “the only
way we can positively know that these units are doing what they are supposed to do
... is to give them no alternative whatsoever. You can’t give them an inch” (Love
1995, 144). To enforce this control, franchisors required franchisees to follow detailed
operations manuals incorporated into the franchise contract. These manuals often
left little to franchisee discretion. As one bemused regulator complained to an IFA
audience in 1976, a certain Mexican food chain’s operations manual opened with the
7
three lines, “Put the key in the door,” “Open the door,” and “Turn on the light”
(International Franchise Association 1976, 3).
Franchisors, however, soon faced a problem in replacing property and employment
with contract as a means of vertical integration. While traditionally antitrust laws
allowed centralized control and coordination within firms, they prohibited many types
of control and coordination between firms, including vertical price-fixing and other
vertical restraints.3 In particular, many antitrust policymakers believed antitrust
laws should protect the independence of small business from domination and control
by larger firms through vertical restraints. For example, when Monte Pendleton,
President of the IFA, argued in 1965 before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly that franchisors should have the same ability to impose constraints through
contract that vertically integrated corporations could impose through administrative
fiat, Jerry Cohen, Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee, was incredulous:
Then what would be the difference between a franchise operation and an
integrated corporation? The argument we get here for franchising is that
it allows an independent businessman to be independent. But if he is told
what product he has to buy, what prices he has to charge, what operation
he has to operate in, then he is no longer independent is he? He is part
of an integrated franchisor’s operation (Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly 1965, 55).
Cohen, articulating a widely held antitrust principle of the time, felt that franchisors
violated the antitrust laws when they constrained the independence of smaller firms
through vertical restraints.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, antitrust policy moved away from the goal
of preserving the independence of small business and towards a consumer welfare
standard focused narrowly on maintaining low consumer prices. Economists replaced
lawyers as top staffers in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the
3The function of antitrust law in “allocating economic coordination rights” is developed in much
greater detail in Paul (2019).
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Federal Trade Commission in the 1960s, bringing with them a focus on prices rising
above marginal cost as the chief evil of monopoly (Eisner 1991). Meanwhile, the
Law and Economics movement, which applied anti-regulation University of Chicago
economic theories to law, grew increasingly influential within the judiciary. According
to Law and Economics doctrines, the proper role of law, especially antitrust law, was
to promote economic efficiency rather than social goals like restraining corporate
power (Posner 1973). Law and Economics antitrust theory was especially helpful
to franchisors by providing scholarly ammunition for their arguments about vertical
contracts, which Law and Economics scholars like Bork (1978) argued should be
presumed efficient because firms would not adopt them if they were not. In particular,
franchisors (Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 1965, written submission of
IFA President Monte Pendelton, 456-458) and Law and Economics (Bork 1966) both
argued that vertical restraints, including price-fixing contracts, promoted efficiency
by enhancing competition between brands even if it hampered competition between
franchisees within brands.
However, franchisees, many of whom had been lured to franchising by the promise
of independent business ownership, often rebelled against vertical restraints. Fran-
chisee frustration with franchisor controls ultimately fueled litigation, in which the
courts judged the various vertical restraints in terms of their compliance with an-
titrust laws. The courts struggled to come to terms with franchising in its initial two
decades. In the White Motor case in 1963, the Supreme Court said it did not have
enough information about franchising to issue a blanket rule on the legality of non-
price vertical restraints. This ruling initiated a period of confusing and sometimes
conflicting judicial rulings.4
4White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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Judicial rulings over vertical restraints reflected a deep divide in legal thinking
about antitrust that ran all the way back to the debates over the passage of the
Sherman Act itself. Was its goal keeping consumer prices low (the “consumer welfare
standard”), as staff economists at the Antitrust Division and FTC, as well as Uni-
versity of Chicago Law and Economics scholars, argued? Or was it meant to restrain
the power of big business, including protecting the independence of small business
from control by larger corporations, as the antitrust tradition associated with Louis
Brandeis held? In the early years of franchising this divide had not yet been resoloved
in favor of the consumer welfare standard. At the beginning of the first Congressional
hearings addressing the new business form, Senator Philip Hart declared, “About the
only area of agreement is that there is disagreement about how the antitrust laws
should be applied in this area” (Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 1965, 2).
It would take two decades for franchisors to comfortably establish the legality of their
business form under antitrust law.
The courts initially applied antitrust law to franchising in a confused manner, ex-
emplified by the bombshell U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co in 1967.5 Schwinn struck down vertical restraints in bicycle manu-
facturer Schwinn’s contracts with its franchisees that barred franchisees from selling
Schwinn bicycles outside their assigned territories. The Court ruled that such vertical
restraints were per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, meaning that such
contract terms were always illegal no matter the circumstances, and courts would
not even listen to evidence justifying them on a case-by-case basis. Nothing dom-
inated the International Franchise Association’s annual legal meeting agendas from
that date through the 1970s as much as the fallout from Schwinn and the IFA’s strat-
5United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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egy to overturn it. Schwinn struck at the heart of franchising by refusing to grant
broad antitrust approval to franchisor vertical restraints on franchisees.6
The ruling put franchising on uncertain legal ground. Over the course of ten years
following the Schwinn decision, franchisors agonized over whether and how Schwinn
might apply to them. The Supreme Court created confusion by grounding its decision
in the fact that Schwinn franchisees took title to the bicycles, and thereby as the owner
had the right to dispose of them free from franchisor vertical interference. According
to a narrow interpretation of the majority opinion, the per se rule in Schwinn only
applied to cases where franchisees took title to the franchisor’s goods, and did not
apply to business format franchisors like Burger King or Jiffy Lube that provided
services under a licensed trademark.
The Federal Trade Commission’s Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising concluded
that the reasoning of Schwinn probably did not apply to service or business format
franchisors (Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising 1969). However, others warned that
Schwinn was the first step in a movement by the courts to protect small business
franchisees from large franchisors. Robert Grossman, Chief of Evaluation for the An-
titrust Division, warned that the Court “left little doubt as to its desire to preserve
the business prerogatives of independent distributors,” and was likely to rule against
franchisors in future business format franchising cases (International Franchise As-
sociation 1970, 73). During this era of antitrust jurisprudence, before the consumer
welfare standard and the Law and Economics movement attained ascendancy, the
idea of a large corporation controlling and dominating a smaller company still evoked
the whiff of antitrust violations. As IFA Chairman Jerrold Van Cise lamented, “Easier
for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a fat franchisor to comply with
6Price restraints will be addressed in more detail below. Maximum vertical price restraints were
per se illegal from 1968 to 1997. Minimum vertical price restraints were per se illegal from 1911 to
2007.
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the antitrust laws when he seeks to control the franchisee” (International Franchise
Association 1968, 25).
Some types of vertical restraints attracted virtually no legal scrutiny. Mini-
mum hours requirements were rarely challenged, and when they did, franchisors won
soundly.7 Vertical restraints upholding quality standards such as sales quotas and con-
trols over service standards, layout and design, and advertising also attracted little
antitrust scrutiny (International Franchise Association 1970, 11). For other types of
vertical restraints, franchisees pursued innovative strategies in devising workarounds
to adverse antitrust rulings, such as partial vertical integration (operating company-
owned shops in competition with franchisee-owned locations), franchisor advertising
of prices, or using the threat of termination or nonrenewal against franchisees who did
not comply with “suggested” prices, products, and so on (Subcommittee on Minority
Small Business Enterprise and Franchising 1973, 96; Committee on Commerce 1976,
26-28). For example, when Siegel v. Chicken Delight prohibited forcing franchisees to
buy inputs from the franchisor as a condition of using the franchise trademark, fran-
chisors largely stopped requiring mandatory purchases. Instead, they adopted lists of
“approved suppliers” and quality standards, and earned income from franchisees by
charging them royalties rather than selling them inputs.8
In other instances, franchising firms engaged in litigation to change the courts’
interpretation of the laws. In key cases the IFA’s lawyers represented franchisors,
and the IFA itself filed amici briefs in support of franchisors, beginning with Susser
v. Carvel in 1965.9 Franchisors benefited from the lack of an organized opposition:
7For example, Gordon v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 423 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
8Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
9Susser v. Carvel Corp., 381 U.S. 125 (1965). Others include Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc, CA
Court of Appeals Civ. 8198 (1967)), Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts 531 F. 2d 1211, Court of Appeals,
3rd Circuit (1976), Siegel v. Chicken Delight 448 F.2d 43, Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit (1971),
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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in most cases, only the IFA and industry-specific franchisor trade associations filed
briefs.
Supplier restrictions, in particular, faced difficult challenges under antitrust law.
For franchisors, maintaining uniform appearance and quality equivalent to that found
in an integrated chain was essential. However, a major obstacle was antitrust law’s
prohibition against tying—requiring a buyer to buy a second, undesired item as a con-
dition of buying a first, desired item. Early court decisions found that the trademark
license was a separate product from the other inputs to a franchise, and could there-
fore be considered a tying item under antitrust law. This opened up franchisors to
challenges from franchisees who did not want to buy other inputs or lease real estate
from franchisors, or from suppliers designated by franchisors.10 At the extreme, an
FTC Bureau of Competition staffer warned IFA members against exclusive deals with
name-brand catsup and soft drink providers, asking, “[is there] a substantial differ-
ence in quality catsups between Heinz, Hunts, and Ritters?” (International Franchise
Association 1971, 114-115). Today we take our inability to get a Pepsi at McDon-
ald’s or a Coke at Taco Bell for granted, but at least some in the FTC questioned
the legality of such vertical restraints in the early years of franchising. Franchisor
attorney Harvey Applebaum noted four years later, “Virtually every major national,
and sometimes even local, fast food or ‘business package’ franchisor is presently or
recently has been under some form of antitrust treble damage attack with respect
to required purchases of products” (International Franchise Association 1975, 64).
In 1975 the Federal Trade Commission required seventy-five fast food franchisors to
answer a questionnaire pertaining to whether they required franchisees to purchase
10Siegel v. Chicken Delight, FTC v Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Perma Life
Mufflers v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Chock Full O’Nuts Corp., FTC Docket No. 8884
(1973).
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products or services from designated suppliers, and to justify any such requirements
(Federal Trade Commission 1975, 12).
Thus, in the mid-1970s franchisors were not certain whether the logic of Schwinn
would be pushed further into business format franchising. Would they be able to
impose sufficient control on franchisees to project a chain store image and achieve
vertical integration by contract, or would the regulators and courts block their efforts
in order to preserve the independence of franchisees? Until the mid-1970s, franchisors
felt the momentum of judicial reasoning was against them and moving in the direction
of “expanding the applicability of the Schwinn doctrine” (Zeidman 1976, 11).
The fortunes of franchisors took a decisively positive turn, however, with the out-
come of the Sylvania case. GTE Sylvania, a product distribution franchisor, restricted
the geographical areas in which its franchised distributors could sell its products. Its
franchisees sued, and the case made its way to the Supreme Court. While considered
a watershed in antitrust jurisprudence today, only the IFA and two industry-specific
franchisor groups filed amici briefs. The Court, in language very similar to that in
the IFA’s amicus brief, overturned Schwinn.11 The decision all but terminated any
uncertainty surrounding non-price vertical restraints, ending a decade of confusion as
to the legality of a key pillar of the franchising business form. Zeidman celebrated
the importance of the case for business format franchisors:
For those operating service franchises or business format franchises, the
haunting question of the applicability of Schwinn in the absence of a sale
and resale context ... has now presumably been rendered academic (Zei-
dman 1977, 15-16).
Zeidman was not exaggerating when he beamed of Sylvania, “With that holding, one
era of franchise litigation comes to an end” (ibid., 11).
While the time period of the analysis in this chapter ends in 1980, it is worth
noting that the permissive logic of Sylvania with respect to vertical restraints did not
11Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14
end with that case. Eventually the courts extended their blessing even to vertical price
restraints. With State Oil Co. v. Khan, the Supreme Court found that maximum
vertical price restraints could be pro-competitive, since they kept consumer prices
low.12 Finally, the the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.
v. PSKS, Inc. overturned the 96-year old per se prohibition on minimum vertical
price restraints.13 There is no more fundamental business decision than what price
to charge. Post-Leegin, franchisors were free to control even this aspect of their
“independent” franchisees’ operations.
1.2 The benefits of vertical separation
At the same time that franchisors sought to achieve centralized economic control
through vertical restraints, they also lobbied and litigated to escape the consequences
of that economic control. They sought to convince government agencies and courts
that economic control through contracts should not entail the same kinds of legal
responsibilities that control through ownership traditionally entailed, especially re-
sponsibilities to workers under employment law. In seeking economic control without
legal responsibilities, franchisors sought to pull in the legal boundaries of the firm,
taking advantage of the differential legal and regulatory treatment of activities oc-
curring inside vs. outside the legal boundaries of the firm.
Thus while franchisors fought to expand the economic control of franchised or-
ganizations through legalization of vertical restraints, they also sought to establish
franchisees’ legal status as independent contractors outside the firm. Franchisors’ first
success in this arena came when the Small Business Administration (SBA) changed
its definition of “small businesses” eligible for SBA assistance to include franchisees.
12State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
13Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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Prior to the 1966 rule change, the SBA considered franchisees, due to vertical con-
trols, to be part of franchisor organizations and not independent businesses at all.14
As SBA Administrator Eugene P. Foley testified in 1965, any requirement that a small
business person “conduct his business in strict conformity with an operating manual
issued by the franchisor,” or establishment by the franchisor of “standards of quality,
service, protection and advertising” rendered the franchisee ineligible (Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly 1965, 9-10). According to Foley, “the major decision for
the Small Business Administration is this: Are we financing the distribution outlets
of large businesses or are we financing independent small businesses as the Congress
intended us to?” (ibid., 19).
Shortly after Foley’s testimony, the SBA decided to revisit the issue of franchising.
In early 1966, the SBA invited academics and businesspeople to present information
and opinions on whether the SBA should change its definition of small business to
include franchisees. The IFA advised the SBA on whom to invite. The IFA’s General
Counsel, President, and Chairman all received inviations to attend.15 Very few,
if any, franchisees participated, however. As then-SBA General Counsel Philip F.
Zeidman wrote to the SBA Administrator, “It must be conceded that the hearing was
inadequate in that most of those participating were either franchisors or associations
representing franchisors.”16
Zeidman recommended that the agency completely abandon any consideration of
franchisor control in approving SBA loans. The SBA followed his advice. The new
14Small Business Size Standards, 13 C. F. R. § 121 (1965). Reproduced in Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly (1965, 382-392).
15Small Business Administration Archive. Record Group 309, National Archives Building, College
Park, MD [hereafter SBA Archive]. Administrative Subject Files 1953-1972, Box 290, File 18 FY
66.
16Action Memorandum for the Administrator, Subject: Hearing on Franchisee Size Standards,
Philip F. Zeidman to Bernard L. Boutin, July 1, 1966, p. 9. SBA Archive: Administrative Subject
Files 1953-1972, Box 290, File 18 FY 66.
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standard for independence under the Small Business Act would be that the franchisee
had the “right to profit” from effort and bore the “risk of loss or failure,” regardless
of the level of control of its business by a larger firm. The rule change opened up
an important new source of financing to franchisors that remains important to this
day: in 2014, forty-three percent of first-time franchisees obtained financing from
SBA loans (Johnson 2015). The SBA rule change was also the first federal response
to the uncertainty released by White Motor, and an early ruling in favor of a more
permissive approach to franchising. Henceforth, for purposes of receiving SBA financ-
ing, franchisees would be considered legally separate businesses, despite the control
exerted by franchisors. The SBA went from skepticism of big business controlling
small business through franchise agreements to being the advocate for franchising
it remains to this day, as foreshadowed by Zeidman’s note to SBA Administrator
Boutin that “SBA will endeavor to influence the shaping of antitrust enforcement
policy with respect to franchising as well as otherwise into directions legitimately and
appropriately beneficial to small business concerns.”17 Zeidman went on to serve as
Washington Counsel to the IFA from 1970 to 2016.
Throughout this period, franchisors also expressed intense anxiety that their con-
trol over franchisee operations might create a legal employment relationship between
themselves and their franchisees, or between themselves and their franchisees’ em-
ployees. While franchisors sought to create an alternative path to large size other
than traditional vertical integration by imposing vertical restrictions on franchisees,
they desperately wanted to keep franchisees and franchised employees outside the legal
boundaries of the firm under employment law. At the 1971 IFA Legal and Government
Affairs Symposium, for example, IFA attorney Jerome Fels chastised McDonald’s for
17Action Memorandum for the Administrator, Subject: Hearing on Franchisee Size Standards,
Philip F. Zeidman to Bernard L. Boutin, Administrator, July 1, 1966, p. 5. SBA Archive: Admin-
istrative Subject Files 1953-1972, Box 290, File 18 FY 66.
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accepting the legal standard of employer/employee relationships in litigation of a
post-termination covenant not to compete,18 warning that “[a]ccepting any theory
that the franchisor/franchisee relationship is an employment relationship or similar
to it might have some unfortunate consequences”(International Franchise Association
1971, 85). Those “unfortunate consequences” were that workers at franchised estab-
lishments would have legal rights against franchisors. Of particular concern was the
possibility that workers could unionize and gain the right to bargain directly with
the franchisor, not just the franchisee that formally employed them, under the “joint
employer” doctrine. As a law professor invited to the IFA’s 1972 legal symposium
explained,
If the [National Labor Relations] Board does not assert jurisdiction, those
employees do not have the protection of the National Labor Relations
Act. They can be fired for union activity, and ... the employees have few
legal rights with respect to union organizing. So it is in the immediate
interest of the McDonald [sic] Corporation to assert that the franchisee is
the sole employer of those employees (International Franchise Association
1972, 41).
IFA General Counsel Harry L. Rudnick sounded the alarm in 1967 after the National
Labor Relations Board ruled that a Mister Softee franchisee’s truck drivers were
employees rather than independent contractors under the definition of the National
Labor Relations Act. The Board ruled that while formally the drivers’ contracts were
those of independent contractors and not wage workers, the substance of the controls
enforced by the franchisor and franchisee removed them from independent contractor
status and put them under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act as
employees. The relevant test, according to the Board, was a “right of control” test:
who controlled the means and manner by which the output was generated?19 While
18McDonalds v. Sandys, 45 Ill. App. 2d 57 (1963).
19Mister Softee Inc. and Curb Service of Indianapolis, Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Work-
ers International Union, AFL-CIO, 162 NLRB 22 (1966).
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the ruling did not challenge the franchise relationship itself, focusing only on the
relationship of ice cream truck drivers to a franchisee, Rudnick warned that “It is not
difficult to project the application of this line of analysis and reasoning to a great
many franchise systems” (Rudnick 1967a, 29).
Franchisors must have breathed a sigh of relief, then, when two years later the
NLRB refused to use franchisor control over franchisees as a reason to expand its
jurisdiction to franchising relationships. In Southland Corporation v. Retail Store
Employees Union, the Board ruled that Southland, the franchisor of 7-11 stores,
was not the joint employer of a franchisee’s employees, because the franchisor did
not directly control the labor relations of the franchised store. According to the
Board, “We have long held that the critical factor in determining whether a joint
employer relationship exists is the control which one party exercises over the labor
relations policy of the other.”20 If franchisors avoided interfering directly in the labor
relations of franchisees, such as by telling them whom to hire and fire or setting shift
schedules, they would avoid triggering NLRB jurisdiction, even if they indirectly
controlled labor conditions by controlling the work process, equipment used, hours
of operation, franchisee prices, and countless other aspects of the business through
contractual restraints.
Franchisors’ concerns with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which regulates
minimum wages and overtime, echoed their anxieties about the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. In a 1978 article in the IFA Current Legal Digest, Lewis Rudnick and John
Dickens, citing a recent Department of Labor interpretive bulletin, highlighted the
risk that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor would find fran-
chisors to be joint employers under the FLSA, making them liable for wage and hour
and overtime violations at franchised establishments (Rudnick and Dickens 1978).
20Southland Corporation v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 428, 170 NLRB 159 (1968).
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As it happened, the courts ultimately defined the meaning of “employer” narrowly in
interpreting the FLSA, relying on a physical control test similar to that of the NRLB
(Power 2016).
In retrospect, franchisor fears seem misplaced, since the NLRB and Department
of Labor would stick to the “right to control” test and refuse to consider the indirect
ways in which one firm could control the labor relations of another firm by controlling
production processes and other aspects of the firm’s operations that determine labor
relations. But for franchisors in the 1960s and 1970s, fighting to establish their
organizational form as a relationship of vertical integration for antitrust purposes
and independent contracting under employment, tax, and other law, franchising’s
legal status did not feel secure just yet.
Franchisors were also apprehensive about courts and regulators finding franchisees
to be inside the boundaries of the firm under other legal regimes. A major concern
was that courts would find franchisors liable for the actions of franchisees under
principal-agent law, under which courts could rule that the franchisor’s control over
the franchisee meant that the franchisee was legally acting on behalf of the franchisor.
In that case the franchisor would be responsible for the franchisee’s actions undertaken
on its behalf. As Lewis Rudnick cautioned in 1967, “[t]he courts will not unlikely say
that the franchisor has guided and controlled its franchisee to the extent necessary
to make him the franchisor’s agent” (Rudnick 1967b, 255-256).
Throughout the 1970s, the IFA fought back attempts by state legislatures to tie
franchisors to franchisees under a variety of laws. After intense lobbying from the IFA,
New Jersey in 1976 restricted an indemnification and warranty bill holding franchisors
responsible for actions taking place within their chains to the automobile industry,
excluding business format franchisees from its jurisdiction (Zwisler 1976). In 1978 the
IFA lobbied against attempts in two states to include franchised chains under chain
store tax regimes (International Franchise Association 1978, 81). That year also saw
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Arizona and Massachusetts consider laws to impose joint tort liability on franchisors
by statute. IFA persuaded the Arizona Senator who introduced the law to withdraw
it, and the Massachusetts legislature rejected a similar bill (ibid., 83).
1.3 Fighting off alternative regulations
Robert Pitofsky, then-Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, grappled with the danger of franchising falling into an unregulated
gap between antitrust and labor law in 1972:
If the relationship is viewed as one between independent businessmen
or businesses ... then it makes sense to apply the public policies of the
antitrust laws, with the prime objective of preserving the franchise as
an independent competitive unit. ... On the other hand, one may view
the relationship as essentially characterized by vastly unequal bargaining
power and access, in which the franchise is ... virtually indistinguishable
from the position of employees or agents. Given this view, it makes sense
to apply the public policies of the National Labor laws (International
Franchise Association 1972, 3).
Pitofsky was uneasy with franchisors’ attempt to create a new kind of status, fran-
chisee, that was neither a truly independent competitor protected by antitrust laws,
nor an employee protected by labor laws.
As franchisors succeeded in avoiding regulation of franchising under either an-
titrust or employment law doctrines, federal and state lawmakers stepped into the
breach to propose regulations to control this new business form, which had escaped
the grasp of traditional doctrines. Their main concern was the gross power imbalance
between the parties. Franchisees were small businesses who signed restrictive, one-
sided contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis from franchisors who were often
large corporations. Indentured servitude and feudal metaphors abounded: franchis-
ing, for example, was “feudal in concept—the lord and the serf” according to a Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee lawyer (International Franchise Association 1973, 60). As
Timothy H. Fine, General Counsel of the National Franchisee Association Coalition
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put it, “if franchisees are to be more than branch managers taking orders from a par-
ent corporation, such power must be curbed” (Subcommittee on Consumer Protection
and Finance 1976, 189).
Laws that equalized bargaining power by prohibiting certain onerous contract
terms soon emerged as an alternative to both labor law and the regulation of vertical
restraints as a means of regulating franchising. Franchisees advocated laws that reg-
ulated the substance of the franchise relationship itself, in particular termination and
non-renewal clauses. The IFA strongly opposed these efforts, and sought to channel
franchise regulatory efforts into laws regulating the sale of franchises, particularly
favoring pre-contract disclosure laws (International Franchise Association 1967). The
first skirmish was fought over the Franchise Competitive Practices Act, introduced in
1967 by Senator Philip Hart, Chair of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
to regulate termination and nonrenewal of franchises. A revised version of Hart’s
bill introduced in 1969 prohibited terminations and failures to renew without cause.
The bill did not pass, and the IFA took credit for killing it (International Franchise
Association 1972, 88). Franchising bills continued to be introduced in subsequent
years, with Representative Abner Mikva’s Franchising Practices Reform Act in 1976
garnering an “an almost unheard of” 109 co-sponsors, according to Zeidman (Interna-
tional Franchise Association 1976, 9). Ultimately, however, like the Hart Bill, Mikva’s
legislation came to nothing.
Franchise relationship laws were also introduced in a number of state legislatures in
the early 1970s, and the IFA played an extremely active role in lobbying and shaping
state legislation, with considerable success. As of 2004, only eighteen states had
relationship laws. Of these, most did not regulate the franchisor’s right to terminate
contracts, requiring only advance notice of termination. Only eight states (Arkansas,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin) required
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that franchisors give franchisees an opportunity to cure defaults before terminating a
franchisee (Barkoff and Seldern 2004, 325).
From the franchisor’s perspective, all this talk of unequal bargaining power was
completely beside the point. Philip Zeidman declared during one hearing, “In fact,
all men are not equal, nor does anything in our law or our history require that they
be so” (Committee on Commerce 1976, 189). The IFA sought to keep franchising
firmly within the domain of contract law, where “buyer beware” governed agreements
between consenting parties, no matter the balance of power between them. The IFA
accordingly pushed pre-contract disclosure rather than post-contract regulation as
the remedy for the alleged abuses in franchising. It argued that as long as franchisees
were warned beforehand about the contents of the contract they signed, there could be
no complaint afterward about the unfairness of any contract term. The IFA drafted
model disclosure legislation and worked closely with lawmakers to introduce and pass
it around the country. The IFA also urged the FTC to adopt a disclosure approach
when the agency announced its intention to regulate franchising in 1971. In 1970,
Lew Rudnick declared the IFA-developed California Franchise Investment Law to be
the IFAs “model act,” and optimistically predicted that in ten years federal legislation
along the lines of that law would be enacted (International Franchise Association 1970,
115). He was almost right—but it would be a Federal Trade Commission regulation,
not a federal statute, that applied the principles of the California law to the whole
country.
While the FTC discussed, but never aggressively pursued, taking action against
dominant franchisors under its Section 5 authority to prohibit unfair methods of
competition, it ultimately took the path favored by the IFA and implemented a dis-
closure rule. The IFA’s allies in advocating for this approach included the Nixon
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White House.21 When the FTC announced its intention to promulgate a trade rule
regulating franchising in 1971, the IFA was there from the beginning, lobbying the
FTC to attack fraud and misrepresentation in franchise sales, but to leave the fran-
chise relationship alone.22 Disclosure regulation was favored by franchisors because it
attacked the “fast buck artists” and frauds who gave franchising a bad name, while
leaving the basic power imbalance at the heart of franchising unchallenged. Dis-
closure, moreover, actually protected franchisors in litigation with franchisees: after
mandatory full disclosure, franchisees could no longer claim franchise contracts were
adhesion contracts that they were forced to sign (International Franchise Association
1975, 2-3). A disclosure rule would thus sanctify franchise contracts as purely pri-
vate, bilateral, arms-length transactions between equal parties in the marketplace,
cementing franchisees’ status as outside the firm.
Franchisees, for their part, never supported and were dismayed by the FTC’s em-
brace of disclosure rather than regulation. Robert Purvin, franchisee lawyer and head
of the American Association of Franchised Dealers, argued during the FTC’s 1995 re-
view that the rule “has achieved a situation of legitimizing what I call systematic
fraud.”23 As franchisee attorney Harold Brown remarked, “with the adoption of this
rule in 1979, the FTC has, for almost all practical purposes, withdrawn from the
conduct regulation activity in which it previously was occupied.”24 The FTC rule
21Federal Trade Commission Public Records, request made by the author [hereafter FTC Public
Records]. Folder 398394087, Document 04, Memo dated March 31, 1972 from the White House
Director of Policy Analysis to FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection.
22FTC Public Records: Folder 398394088, Document 01, Statement on Behalf of International
Franchise Association before the Federal Trade Commission Hearing on Proposed Trade Regulation
Rule, 10 A.M., February 14, 1972, Presented by Philip F. Zeidman.
23FTC Public Records: Folder 296701583, Document 02, In the Matter of: Periodic Review of
Franchise Rule, Docket No. P954402, Tuesday, September 12, 1995, Crown Sterling Suites 901-34th
Ave, Bloomington, Minnesota, p. 16.
24FTC Public Records: Folder 296701583, Document 02, In the Matter of: Periodic Review of
Franchise Rule, Docket No. P954402, Thursday, September 14, 1995, Crown Sterling Suites 901-34th
Ave, Bloomington, Minnesota, p. 587
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was finally enacted in 1979. With Sylvania and the FTC rule, franchisors ended the
1970s with their regulatory agenda largely achieved.
1.4 Conclusion
By 1980, franchisors had succeeded in establishing their organizational innovation
under the law, giving them rights to coordination and control consistent with vertical
integration without triggering the responsibilities, under employment and other laws,
that traditionally accompanied integration. The Supreme Court gave franchisors the
right to vertically integrate by contract, rather than direct ownership, through non-
price vertical restraints. The FTC, meanwhile, abandoned any attempt to reduce the
power imbalance between franchisees and franchisors, adopting the IFA’s preferred
policy of pre-contract disclosure rather than post-contract regulation. The IFA si-
multaneously beat back most attempts at the federal and state level to regulate the
franchise relationship beyond disclosure requirements. Finally, employment and other
laws that New Deal-era policy had used to socially control corporations did not adapt
to changing legal forms and remained fixated on narrow, formalistic definitions of the
boundaries of the firm.
This chapter has shown how the creation of franchising entailed a political and le-
gal struggle to shrink the legal boundaries of the firm relative to its economic bound-
aries. Franchisors persuaded regulators, courts, and legislatures to allow them to
pursue de facto vertical integration by contract (imposing vertical restraints such as
customer and price restrictions on their franchisees), while simultaneously claiming
benefits of vertical separation, such as eligibility for Small Business Administration
assistance and avoidance of tax, labor, and other laws that would apply if franchisees
were not legally separate entities. Franchisors transformed business practices that
rested on shaky legal ground in the 1960s into legal components of a new business
form.
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CHAPTER 2
FRANCHISING AS POWER-BIASED
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Recent groundbreaking research by Krueger and Ashenfelter (2017) has high-
lighted how franchise corporations like McDonald’s control labor costs at indepen-
dent franchised establishments through the imposition of no-poaching agreements,
which prohibit franchisees from hiring each other’s workers. Krueger and Ashenfel-
ter argue that these agreements are a mechanism to facilitate franchisee monopsony
power. After the publication of this research, some franchisors have started to cease
including such agreements in franchise contracts (Johnson 2018). While eliminating
these agreements removes a particularly egregious mechanism for restraining wages,
this chapter argues that franchisor control over labor costs and working conditions
at franchised establishments goes far beyond no-poaching agreements. Franchising,
I argue, is a mechanism to extract effort from a low-wage workforce. It reduces ex-
penditures on monitoring and efficiency wages, allowing the franchisor and franchisee
to share the profits from extra effort. However, because franchisors are not the le-
gal employers of production workers, franchisors escape legal responsibility for their
terms and conditions of employment. The analysis of contractual provisions provided
here shows that franchisors are, in a sense, co-employers who exercise de facto control
over terms of employment. This organizational structure strengthens the bargaining
power of employers over workers.
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2.1 Efficiency theories of franchising
Under incomplete contracts with imperfect information, the principals who own
franchised chains must pay the agents who manage each location a premium over their
next-best alternative (their “fallback position”) to elicit their work effort. Agents
paid a premium eschew shirking because if they do not exert the desired effort level
they can be terminated, losing access to the premium. For this reason the premium
is often called an “enforcement rent.” Efficiency and power are closely related in
principal-agent models, and power can be exercised in ways that increase or decrease
efficiency.
Principals offering enforcement rents have power over their agents because they
have the ability to induce agents to act in ways that further their own interests, while
agents lack this ability with respect to principals. By threatening to withdraw the
enforcement rent, principals can induce agents to act in ways that further their own
interests. This exercise of power is Pareto-improving: rather than pay the agent his
or her reservation wage to work at his or her reservation effort level, the principal
pays an enforcement rent, resulting in both higher profits for the principal and higher
income for the agent (Bowles and Gintis 2007).
In these so-called efficiency wage models, principals not only must pay an enforce-
ment rent, but also invest in monitoring to detect shirking. Pareto improvements
are therefore still possible, since monitoring, unlike higher wages, has a social cost.
Making the agents residual claimants on output solves the principal-agent problem
by fully aligning their incentives with the principals, eliminating the need to monitor
their effort and creating a Pareto improvement over even the wage premium-plus-
monitoring alternative (Bowles 1985; Bowles and Gintis 1988; Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984). With royalty rates averaging only five percent of gross sales, franchise con-
tracts in the fast food industry make franchisees virtually complete residual claimants
on output.
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Models of franchising emphasize these efficiency aspects of franchise contracts,
focusing on how franchisor-principals incentivize franchisee-agents to provide high
levels of effort (Mathewson and Winter 1985; Rubin 1978; Norton 1988a). Empirical
support is provided by Lafontaine and Slade (1997), who show that the importance
of the franchisee’s effort is positively related to the use of high-powered incentives in
franchise contracts, and that high costs of monitoring are positively related to the
use of franchised outlets relative to company-owned and -operated outlets.
However, the existence of externalities gives franchisees some power against fran-
chisors through their ability to affect franchisor profitability through shirking. For
example, franchisees can free-ride on the franchisor’s brand name. Franchisors there-
fore must invest in enforcement rents and monitoring to internalize these externali-
ties, even though franchisees are residual claimants. Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994)
show that McDonald’s does indeed pay enforcement rents to its franchisees. Rather
than extract the full value of the franchise, it leaves money on the table to induce
effort. Moreover, McDonald’s specifically selects wealth-constrained franchisees who
must depend on their franchise for their livelihoods, and thus have the most to lose
from termination of the enforcement rent. Franchisors also invest in monitoring.
They send “secret shoppers” to franchised establishments, and monitor franchisee
cash registers and operations through real time “point of sale” systems. Moreover, as
will be shown below, franchisors also supercharge the incentives of residual claimancy
through investments in bargaining power.
We can model the franchisor-franchisee relationship according to the familiar ef-
ficiency wage model. Franchisor profits are represented by the equation:
pi = s[y(ne(m,w, s;h))− n(m+ w)] (1)
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Franchisors share profits with franchisees.1 In this model, s is the franchisor’s share of
profits (so 1− s is therefore the share left to franchisees). Revenues, y, are a function
of the number of franchisees, n, and the effort of each franchise, e. I assume identical
franchisees throughout this paper. Effort is in turn a function of the level of franchisor
monitoring of franchisees, m, operating costs (including wages), w, the franchisor’s
profit share, s and the franchisee’s exogenous fallback position, h. em > 0 (increased
monitoring increases franchisee effort), ew < 0 (higher costs lower franchisee returns
to effort) and es < 0 (franchisees have weaker incentives to exert effort when the
franchisor’s profit share is high). The cost side of the profit equation contains the
number of outlets times the monitoring costs m and operating costs w.
Franchisors vary n, m, w, and s to maximize profits. Franchisor first order condi-
tions are given by:
y′ =
m+ w
e
(2.1)
e
m+ w
= em = ew (2.2)
e
sy
= es (2.3)
(2.1) states that the marginal product of franchisee effort equals the unit cost of
effort. (2.2) states that the marginal effect of variations in the level of monitoring
and operating costs equals the average level of effort per dollar of expenditures. (2.3)
states that the marginal impact on effort of varying the franchisor’s profit share
equals the average level of effort per dollar in revenue. Profitability is increased when
monitoring costs or operating costs fall. Because franchisors and franchisees share the
profits of the franchise system, franchisors benefit from low franchise-level operating
1In practice, most franchisors charge a royalty on revenues rather than profits, because profits
are considered too easy for franchisees to manipulate. For analytical convenience, I have set up
a profit-sharing rather than revenue-sharing model. In practice under a revenue-sharing contract
franchisors and franchisees split the surplus from franchisee unit operations, so the profit-sharing
model is apt.
29
costs, including low wages. Franchisor profitability’s relationship to the profit share
parameter is ambiguous: a higher franchisor profit share directly benefits franchisors,
but at the cost of decreasing franchisee effort, which lowers the revenues available for
sharing between franchisors and franchisees.
Franchisees, meanwhile, determine their effort levels by maximizing the objective
function U ,
U = (1− t(e))v(e) + t(e)h(a, y¯, λ) (3)
In this equation, t(e) represents the termination function, capturing the effect of
effort on the probability of the franchisee being terminated and reverting to his or
her fallback position. Greater effort reduces the likelihood of termination, so t′ < 0.
The function v(e) describes the value of the franchise to the franchisee.2
v(e) is increasing and concave, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0, for two reasons. First, franchisee
income (and, cumulatively, assets) are increasing in effort, but the franchisee expe-
riences a declining marginal utility of income and wealth. Second, effort carries a
disutility, and disutility increases at an accelerating rate at higher levels of effort.
Note that unlike standard efficiency wage models, franchisee income is not a flat
wage but varies with effort. Finally, h(a, y¯, λ) represents the franchisee’s fallback po-
sition, which is a function of the value of the franchisee’s assets outside the franchise
relationship, a, the franchisee’s expected income outside the franchise relationship, y¯,
and the probability of finding income-generating activity outside the franchise rela-
tionship, λ. Franchisees vary effort to maximize utility, taking their fallback position
as exogenous, giving the following first order condition:
2A more explicit function for v is:
v = v( 1−sn pi(e,m,w, s), d(e)) (4)
Franchisee income, 1−sn pi is the franchisee’s share of profits, and d is the franchisee’s disutility of
effort.
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ve = te
h− v
1− t (5)
That is, starting at a high level of effort, franchisees decrease effort until the
marginal utility of effort (reflecting both increased income from effort and disutility
of effort) just equals the marginal effect of decreasing effort on the expected value of
the fallback position as weighted by the probability of termination. At this stage, the
model shows that by internalizing externalities through monitoring and enforcement
rents, and aligning incentives with franchisors through residual claimancy, franchise
contracts raise franchisor profits through improvements in efficiency.
2.2 Franchising, labor discipline, and efficiency
Franchisors go beyond the efficiency-enhancing exercises of power described in the
first section, however. They also make investments in bargaining power to reduce
the fallback position of franchisees. By reducing the franchisee’s fallback position,
franchisors can induce franchisees to work harder, raising output and franchisor prof-
its. The extra output is not a genuine productivity increase, because output has
not increased per unit input. Rather, one input has been squeezed into producing
additional output.
From equations (3) - (5) above, we see that franchisors can increase franchisee ef-
fort by decreasing the (exogenous to franchisees) franchisee fallback position, h(a, y¯, λ).
By a reasonable assumption, the franchisee fallback position is increasing in franchisee
assets a and expected income y¯ outside the franchise relationship, and also increasing
in the probability of finding income-generating economy activity outside the franchise
relationship λ. Interventions that reduce the fallback position shift the franchisee’s
effort function inward, which through the franchisor’s first order conditions (2.1) -
(2.3) increases franchisor profits. I discuss some of these interventions in detail in the
next section.
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Moreover, franchisees are a special kind of agent. They are not potentially shirk-
ing production workers who directly produce the output, as envisioned in classic
efficiency-wage-type principal-agent models. Rather, they are the monitors. As Nor-
ton (1988b, 202) points out, this aspect of franchising makes labor intensity a key
variable explaining which industries deploy franchise contracts. Since workers, not
machines, have a propensity to shirk, franchise contracts only make sense in labor-
intensive industries like fast food. Franchising thus solves principal-agent problems
between owners and management only to face them again one level lower, between
management and labor. Furthermore, franchisors have a direct stake in labor costs.
Since franchisors and franchisees share the profits from franchised outlets, franchisors
benefit from lower labor costs.
The franchisee’s role as labor monitor has efficiency and fairness implications
that have been overlooked by the franchising literature, which tends to examine the
efficiency implications of franchise contracts for the owner-manager principal-agent
problem, without looking further into the manager-worker relationship. As the so-
ciologist Felstead (1993) points out, franchisee contracts maximize franchisee effort
toward maximizing worker effort.3 But workers are not residual claimants in fran-
chising systems and the efficiency (and fairness) claims made for franchising do not
extend to them and their non-contractable effort. Rather than being motivated by
residual claimancy, franchisors motivate workers through a combination of monitor-
ing and the offer of enforcement rents. The organizational innovation of franchising,
by improving the ability of franchisors to monitor workers through the effort of fran-
chisees, is designed to decrease the power of production workers in franchised chains
in order to extract extra effort. This biases franchisees toward intense monitoring
3Felstead also argues, as this chapter does, that the mere extraction of additional effort from
labor cannot be considered a true efficiency gain. However, he dismisses the relevance of the type
of principal-agent/labor discipline models that I rely on to show that point, claiming (I believe
erroneously) that such models ignore power.
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and effort extraction strategies over high-wage efficiency wage or employee skilling
strategies.
Skott and Guy (2007) argue that because the size of the enforcement rent depends
on the employee’s ability to affect profitability by varying his or her own effort, workers
have power over employers to the extent that they can control their effort and effect
outcomes important to employers. Technological changes that increase managers’
ability to monitor workers decrease worker power. In a formal model, they show
how such “power-biased technical change” can increase profitability by increasing
effort extraction from workers, even if the new technology is less technically efficient
than existing technologies. The negative effect on profits of lower technical efficiency
in such cases is more than made up for by the decrease in workers’ power and the
accompanying changes in effort and wages.
We can think of franchising as an example of power-biased organizational change
within Skott and Guy’s framework. The organizational innovation of franchising,
by solving the principal-agent problem between owners and managers, influences the
principal-agent problem one level down, between managers and production workers.
By highly incentivizing franchisee-managers to monitor production workers, franchis-
ing as an organizational innovation increases employer power in Skott and Guy’s
model just as surely as a new surveillance technology. The use of franchising, even
if it has no effect on technical efficiency, can increase franchisor profits by extracting
additional effort from production workers.
2.3 Investments in bargaining power over franchisees
The initial source of the franchisor’s bargaining power over franchisees is its prod-
uct market power, derived from its trademark and trade name. These give the fran-
chisor a type of power known as “short-side” power: the power to control access to
scarce resources of which quantities are limited (Bowles and Gintis 2007). In markets
33
characterized by short-side power the market does not clear, and there are queues
on the short side of the market consisting of those who would like to transact on
terms being offered to others but are unable to do so. The franchisor’s ability to
restrict access to its brand name gives it the ability to confer a rent on the franchisees
with whom it does transact, since the fallback position for the franchisee is exclusion
from the brand. Exclusion means competing with the franchisor’s established chain,
with years of consumer recogntion behind it, as an independent business. Franchisees
have attested to the power of the brand name, noting that they experience difficulty
persuading customers, banks, or real estate owners to do business with them as an in-
dependent firms in competition with established brands. When the fallback position
is operating without a brand name and competing with McDonald’s or Burger King,
affiliation with an established brand confers a rent on the independent businessperson-
cum-franchisee, a rent that franchisors can threaten to withdraw. As Richard Riggs,
a Dunkin’ Donuts franchisee testified before Congress in April 1976, explaining why
he signed such a restrictive franchise contract, “We had counsel at the time but we
had not very much choice. We had limited funds. I had the choice of going with a
franchisor or opening up Riggs Donut Shop on the corner and competing with the
franchisor” (Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance 1976, 93).
Beyond the rents conferred by association with the brand name, franchisors also
require franchisees to sign contracts that raise the value of this rent. For exam-
ple, franchisees are required to make investments in relationship-specific sunk assets
(oddly shaped buildings, proprietary signage and equipment, their own industry-
specific human capital) that have value inside the franchise relationship, but little
value outside it, raising the value of v relative to h. According to Dnes (1993),
franchisors create most of this asset-specificity through trademarking fixtures and
equipment, and through restrictive convenants in franchise contracts. Some common
34
terms of franchise agreements increase franchisee sunk investments. As Representa-
tive Abner Mikva said in 1976,
Once the agreement is entered into, the franchisee is totally dependent on
the products, services or tradename supplied by the franchisor. Loss of
the right to use the franchisor’s tradename or distribute the franchisor’s
product or service results in economic ruin for the franchisee. It is a
relationship that more closely resembles one between a master and his
indentured servant than between economically equal contracting parties
(Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance 1976, 53-54).
Franchisee lawyer Barry Kellman testified to Congress in 1988 that “bargaining power
changes over time to the greater advantage of the franchisor” due to sunk, firm-specific
investments the franchisees make over time and the costs the franchisors contractually
impose for leaving the relationship, such as non-compete agreements and restrictions
on sales and tranfers (Subcommittee on Antitrust, Impact of Deregulation, and Pri-
vatization 1988, 44). Franchisee lawyer Peter Singler testified that:
I ask one question when a new client comes into my office, and that is, if
you weren’t already in this system, would you do it all over again? The an-
swer, without exception, has been “Absolutely not.” And it is usually fol-
lowed with a statement, “But because of non-competition covenants, be-
cause of restrictions on sourcing, because of restrictions on transferability–
on my ability to sell my business–I can’t get out, and so I’ve got to make
the best of it” (Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
1999, 100).
Franchisor investments in bargaining have not gone unnoticed by franchising schol-
ars. Michael (2000) shows that franchisor investments in bargaining power, such as
covenants not to compete, reduce litigation between franchisors and franchisees. Dnes
(1993) argues that the requirement that franchisees reduce their own fallback positions
in franchise contracts through sunk investments is yet another sign of franchising’s
efficiency, as it acts as a screening and signalling device. Franchisees who have what
it takes, he argues, will self-select into franchise rather than alternative contracts,
their willingess to do so acting as a signal to franchisors of their high productivity.
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However, Dnes’s claim demands a high degree of information and foresight from
franchisees. For one thing, franchisees may not be aware of the full meaning of the
highly restrictive contracts they sign at the moment they sign them. And even if
they are, real economic agents are loss-averse, weighing future losses more heavily
than future gains from any point in time (Benartzi and Thaler 1995). Thus, the
franchisee is in effect a different economic agent before and after signing the franchise
contract. Once they start making sunk investments, they overweight the cost of losing
them. As franchisees accumulate sunk investments over time, the bargaining power
of the franchisor increases, as the franchising lawyers quoted above testified.
An analysis of franchise contracts reveals the prevalance of these and other meth-
ods of increasing franchisor bargaining power. From the State of Wisconsin, I collected
franchise contracts from all 530 franchisors operating in Wisconsin with more than
eighty-five outlets nationwide. This set includes all the national chains plus some
regional chains as well. The data discussed below all come from these contracts.
Contract terms that reduce the bargaining power of franchisees include the following:
• Franchisor remote, independent access to franchisee data increases the effective-
ness of franchisor monitoring, raising the sensitivity of the termination function
t(e) to franchisee effort. Increases in monitoring effectiveness reduce the size of
the enforcement rent necessary to induce a given level of effort. Ninety percent of
fast food franchise contracts require franchisees to give franchisors independent
access to their computers and data. What is more, eighty-three percent require
the franchisee to give the franchisor the ability to withdraw funds directly from
the franchisee’s bank account.
• Virtually all franchise contracts require franchisees to sign covenants not to
compete with the franchisor for a period of time after the franchise contract
ends. Such covenants raise the expected duration of time before the franchise
can earn income again, 1
λ
, and reduce the value of his or her human capital a
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by temporarily prohibiting continued employment in the industry in which he
or she has developed skills. The average duration of the noncompete agreement
in fast food is twenty months.
• Franchisors tend to require franchisees to give them a right of first refusal in
any sale of the franchisee’s business. The ability of the franchisor to swoop in
at any time depresses the resale value of the franchise, and thus the franchisee’s
wealth should it exit the franchise relationship, a. Ninety-two percent of fast
food contracts contain this clause.
• Franchisors also often give themselves a right to purchase the franchisee’s assets
at expiration of the contract, restricting the universe of potential buyers and
similarly reducing a. Fifty-nine percent of contracts contain this clause.
• Many franchisees require that franchisees personally operate their franchised
outlets. This indicates a preference for natural persons rather than incorporated
enterprises as franchisees, the former having a lower wealth endowment a and
thus a lower fallback position. Forty-nine percent of contracts require a personal
obligation to operate.
• Franchisors frequently require franchisees to give the franchisor recourse to their
personal assets in legal disputes. Some even require the franchisee’s spouse to
sign such a personal guarantee as well. This raises the franchisee’s cost of
leaving the franchise relationship early or misbehaving during the relationship,
as their entire personal assets are put at risk by doing so, further reducing a.
Ninety-four percent of fast food contracts contain a personal guarantee, and
thirty-three percent a spousal guaranteee.
• Finally, franchisors frequently require franchisees to agree to mandatory arbi-
tration clauses, in which franchisees sign away rights they have under the law
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to a jury trial, class action litigation, and the like, and forum clauses, in which
franchisees agree that any litigation must take place in the geographical juri-
sidiction of the franchisor’s choosing. The former blocks the franchisee from
access to the legal system to settle disputes, while the latter dramatically raises
the cost of litigation to the franchisee. These clauses limit the ability of the
franchisee to recover damages that could form the assets to start a new busi-
ness, a. Fifty-five percent of contracts contain a mandatory arbitration clause,
and ninety percent contain a forum restriction.
Table 2.1 contains information on the use of these contract terms, and other contract
terms discussed later in the paper, in both the whole sample of 530 contracts and the
78 contracts from fast food industry franchisors.
These exercises of power through the contract terms and restrictive covenants
above can result in exploitative outcomes, but also in Pareto improvements. Resid-
ual claimancy solves the principal-agent problem, reducing unproductive monitoring
expenditures and enabling the creation of additional output. Because franchisees are
near-residual claimants, franchising is in a sense fair: franchisees get nearly the entire
benefit of the extra effort that these onerous contract terms extract from them.
However, much depends on the shape of the franchisee utility function with respect
to income and disutility of effort. Efficiency wage models focus on worker shirking,
with enforcement rents inducing them to provide the contracted-for level of effort.
Franchisee effort, in contrast, is a continuum of effort rather than a binary shirk or
do not shirk choice, and franchise contracts have the potential to extract effort beyond
the level the franchisee would have agreed to before becoming bound by the contract.
For example, if franchisees are “satisficers” targeting a given level of income with only
small utility gains beyond that point, investments in bargaining power can lower their
fallback position such that they work harder than they would have agreed to before
entering the franchise relationship. The extra output is not a genuine productivity
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increase, because output has not increased per unit input. Rather, one input has
been squeezed into producing additional output.
2.4 Increasing power over workers
As I show in the next chapter, franchisors focus franchisees on labor supervi-
sion by taking away their discretion in other areas through the imposition of vertical
restraints—contractual controls that limit their choice set to a few variables. Looking
again to Table 2.1, in my sample of fast food franchise contracts, on average seventy-
eight percent of franchisee purchases must be acquired from suppliers restricted by
the franchisor. Ninety-five percent of contracts restrict franchisees to selling only
franchisor-approved products. Ninety-two percent set mandatory hours of operation.
And fifty-six percent even set maximum or minimum prices. Each one of these restric-
tions takes discretion away from the franchisee and focuses franchisee effort on labor
management and discipline. According to Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2009, 119), fast
food industry insiders report that “labor schedule changes and flexibility in hours
per week per worker are among the most important margins that managers have at
their disposal to keep production costs down,” highlighting the lack of ability to alter
other variables affecting profitability and the importance of labor costs to fast food
profitability.
What is more, some franchisors intervene directly to hold wages down at their
franchisees’ restaurants. Sixty-nine percent of fast food franchisors in my sample
impose no-poaching clauses, which forbid franchisees from hiring workers away from
each other. Krueger and Ashenfelter (2017) find evidence that the incidence of these
clauses is associated with low-wage, high-turnover industries indicating that their
purpose is to increase franchisee monopsony power over production workers.
Incentivizing franchisees through residual claimancy and effort-extracting contract
terms mitigates the need to spend money on paying for monitoring or efficiency wages
39
of production workers, allowing the franchisor and franchisee to share the profits
from extra effort extracted from workers. Franchisors structure contracts to focus the
energies of franchisees on labor effort extraction. The workplaces reflect this: rather
than invest in worker skills, franchised fast food establishements are highly Taylorist
and designed to employ workers with a minimum of training. Highly vigilant labor
supervisors create a precarious workforce thourgh “flexible” scheduling and extract
maximum effort from them when they are on the job. Rather than invest in training
or skills, franchisors incentivize franchisees to extract effort from a high-turnover,
poorly trained workforce. Industry average data are consistent with such a labor
market strategy: the industry-average wage in fast food is $10.88 per hour, and 28.62
percent of workers in the industry have less than one year of tenure at their current
job.
2.5 The short side of the market and trickle-down power
Franchising is an example of a multi-level principal-agent problem. It is essential
to understand both levels. In the first level, franchisors have power over franchisees,
as evidenced by the existence of enforcement rents. In the second level, franchisors
also have power over production workers, which they exercise through their fran-
chisees. The franchisor’s product market power (enhanced by investments in con-
tractual power over franchisees), cascades downward into the market for franchise
management opportunities, and further downward into the labor market.
There are similarities between franchising and the model of linked credit, manage-
ment and labor markets in Bowles (2006, 359). In this model of linked non-clearing
markets, demand outstrips supply, resulting in queues of “quantity constrained” in-
dividuals who would like to contract at the going price but are unable to do so.
Principals on the “short side” of the market, the side where the desired number of
transactions is least, have power over their agents on the “long side” because the
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former can offer the latter rents, defined as payments above their fallback position.
Meanwhile there are individuals who would like to have franchise contracts with a
recognized brand but are unable to secure them, just as there are unemployed workers
who would like jobs at the going wage but are unable to land them. These individuals
are “quantity constrained,” and their presence limits the bargaining position of long
side agents. Principals on the short side of each market can therefore confer rents on
“long-side” agents, and thus exercise power over them. In this way, principals with
access to scarce resources exercise power over the agents with whom they contract.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this process in the context of franchising.
In the figure, brands receive rents from the product market. Firms that do not
have brand names are consigned to a status as marginal producers at the fringes
of the product market. Down a level, in the market for franchise opportunities,
franchisors, which are the brands on the long side at the higher level, exercise power
over franchisees by their ability to control access to valued brand names. Some of
the franchisees in this market may even be those excluded, or “quantity constrained”
from the higher market. Franchisees, in turn, are the bosses in the labor market,
one level down from the market for franchise opportunities. They have power over
workers in the labor market as bosses, by their ability to control access to scarce jobs.
Labor law, focused narrowly on employee status, confines labor issues to the bottom
level only. The working conditions at the bottom, however, are determined several
levels up, by the market power of franchise corporations.
2.6 Conclusion
Franchising is an example of power-biased organizational change. The structure
of franchise contracts contains some features that increase profits through efficiency
improvements, but others that do so through extracting additional effort from the
labor input. The use of a franchised business model, in which franchisees are highly
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incentivized to manage, and extract effort from, low-wage, high-turnover workers,
is thus a kind of labor management strategy. However, because franchisors are not
the legal employers of production workers under franchising, franchisors escape legal
responsibility for their working conditions.
Franchise contracts shape outcomes at franchised establishments while avoiding
franchisor legal responsibility for outcomes. This chapter also provides evidence that
existing legal criteria of who is an “employer” responsible for working conditions may
be in error, as franchisors, whatever their legal relationships with production workers,
intimately shape their working conditions through their contracts with franchisees.
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2.7 Chapter 2 tables and figures
Table 2.1. Prevalence of selected contract terms in franchise contracts
Contract feature All industries Fast food
Franchisee Effort-Inducing Contract Terms
Avg royalty rate (pct gross sales) 5.1% 4.9%
Pct of contracts: ind data access 79% 83%
Pct of contracts: ind bank account access 81% 90%
Avg duration of non-compete (months) 19.03 20.31
Pct of contracts: right of 1st refusal 85% 92%
Pct of contracts: right to purchase at expiration 49% 59%
Pct of contracts: obligation to operate 35% 49%
Pct of contracts: personal guarantee 93% 94%
Pct of contracts: spousal guarantee 38% 33%
Pct of contracts: mandatory arbitration 58% 55%
Pct of contracts: forum clause 91% 90%
Vertical Restraints
Avg percent of purchases from restricted sources 47% 78%
Pct of contracts: prohibit unapproved products 91% 95%
Pct of contracts: mandatory hours of operation 64% 92%
Pct of contracts: set max or min prices 45% 56%
Pct of contracts: no poaching clause 55% 69%
N 530 78
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CHAPTER 3
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND THE CREATION OF A
FISSURED WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM
FRANCHISE CONTRACTS
Vertical restraints—contractual controls imposed by an upstream firm on the op-
erations of a downstream firm, such as price, supplier and customer restrictions—are
the essential features of franchise contracts. The presence or absence of particular
vertical restraints determines which business decisions the franchisor seeks to control,
and which it seeks to delegate downstream. Federal courts initially looked skeptically
on the imposition of vertical restraints, questioning the legality under antitrust law
of big business dominating and controlling small business through restrictive con-
tracts.1 However, since Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), franchisors have had wide latitude to impose non-price vertical restraints.
Since Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007),
they have had similar freedom to impose price vertical restraints.
3.1 Explanations for vertical restraints
3.1.1 Agency costs
Franchising is a principal-agent relationship, and most existing theoretical treat-
ments of vertical restraints in franchising focus on agency costs to explain the imposi-
tion of vertical restraints. The presence of externalities, for example, drives franchisors
to impose vertical restraints because franchisees have incentives to free ride on the
1United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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value of the franchisor’s brand, by shirking, substituting lower-quality inputs, or can-
nibalizing sales from existing locations rather than seeking new customers. Mandating
mandatory hours of operation, restricting sources of supply or imposing location re-
strictions can limit franchisee opportunities for free-riding (Tesler 1960; Mathewson
and Winter 1984; Blair and Lafontaine 2010). Meanwhile maximum price controls,
a major type of vertical restraint, can eliminate the double marginalization problem,
which occurs when franchisors and franchisees both have market power, resulting in
a double markup over marginal cost. Maximum prices imposed by the franchisor can
bring price and quantity closer to the competitive levels (Spengler 1950; Blair and
Lafontaine 2010). Under these theories, franchisors facing higher agency costs are
more likely to impose vertical restraints.
3.1.2 Information and uncertainty
The risk and incentives model of Prendergast (2002), meanwhile, suggests that
risk and uncertainty should drive decisions of whether or not to impose vertical re-
straints. In Prendergast’s model, under conditions of high uncertainty (high variance
of output), principals do not know which tasks should be undertaken or how, and
delegate authority to their agents. Under lower levels of uncertainty, principals do
know what tasks should be undertaken and how, and delegate fewer tasks. Vertical
restraints, which take discretion away from franchisees rather than leaving them free
to make their own decisions, can be seen as alternatives to delegating authority to
franchisees. Under Prendergast’s theory, franchisors facing less variable output are
more likely to impose vertical restraints.
3.1.3 Targeting a vulnerable workforce
Finally, the decision to impose vertical restraints may be driven in part by labor
market considerations. Krueger and Ashenfelter (2017) find a strong empirical rela-
tionship between the presence of one type of vertical restraint in franchise contracts,
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a no-poaching clause, in which franchisees are prohibited from hiring each others’
employees, and industry-level low wages and high employee turnover. They interpret
their results as suggesting that the purpose of such contract clauses is to facilitate
oligopsony by restricting the mobility of high-turnover workers, reducing their wages
and increasing the rents available to be shared between franchisors and franchisees.
There may be more to the relationship between vertical restraints and workforce
characteristics than Krueger and Ashenfelter’s monopsony results suggest, however.
For one thing, vertically dis-integrated organizational structures like franchising, in
which independent smaller franchisees stand between larger brands and workers, have
created what David Weil (2014) has called “fissured workplaces.” These are work-
places in which the “lead” firm (in this case the franchisor) focuses on the highest-
value-added activities (in this case licensing the trademark) and outsources low-value-
added, labor-intensive activities to third parties. In fissured workplaces, the legal
boundaries of the firm act as barriers excluding workers outside them from gaining
access to firm-specific and union rents, internal career ladders, and legal protections
(whose coverage remains largely limited to the firm in which the worker has formal
employee status). Vertical restraints create fissured workplaces, because without the
ability to control quality through extensive vertical restraints franchisors would be
forced to directly own and operate production units to achieve uniform levels of qual-
ity control. Workplace fissuring reduces labor costs, and the ability to fissure the
workplace may be another factor driving the use of vertical restraints. The poor
quality of franchised jobs, in fact, has long been known. Krueger (1991) finds that
wages are lower at franchised outlets than at outlets directly owned by the parent
company, and that company-owned restaurants have a steeper tenure-earnings profile.
Ji and Weil (2015) find that franchised outlets have more wage and hour violations
than company-owned outlets.
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Vertical restraints do more than simply fissure workplaces, lowering costs by ex-
cluding workers from rents. They also limit the labor relations strategies open to
franchisees. Vertical restraints focus the energies of franchisees on labor cost control
and the extraction of effort from workers by taking away franchisee discretion in other
areas. As the imposition of vertical restraints regarding sourcing, pricing, hours of
operation, product selection and other decisions removes items from franchisee discre-
tion, their profit-making options are constrained. As I show in the previous chapter,
other features of franchise contracts (non-compete clauses, mandatory arbitration,
and more) reduce the fallback position of franchisees, inducing them to exert high
levels of effort. Vertical restraints focus and direct that franchisee effort towards ex-
tracting production worker effort. According to a report by the National Employment
Law Project in 2014:
While the [franchisors] claim that they have no influence over wages paid
to workers, they control wages by controlling every other variable in the
businesses except wages (Ruckelshaus et al. 2014, 11).
Supplier restrictions are especially consequential here, since they take away fran-
chisees’ ability to control their own non-labor costs, forcing them to focus all the
more on restraining labor costs for their margins. Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2009,
119) cite fast food industry insiders as reporting that “labor schedule changes and
flexibility in hours per week per worker are among the most important margins that
managers have at their disposal to keep production costs down,” highlighting the
lack of ability to alter other costs and the importance of labor costs to fast food
profitability.
Franchisors that impose extensive vertical restraints are likely pursuing a dif-
ferent franchising strategy than those that delegate more authority to franchisees.
Franchisors that delegate more tasks to franchisees are likely to rely more on the
entrepreneurial abilities and discretion of their franchisees, including allowing them
the freedom to pursue various labor market strategies, including employee skilling or
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efficiency wage strategies. Franchisors that do not delegate, but control most details
of franchisee businesses through vertical restraints, are likely to rely on their fran-
chisees’ role as labor monitor rather than entrepreneur. Franchisor firms pursuing
this strategy would be expected to structure franchise contracts to target workers
with low bargaining power, relying on brute effort extraction rather than employee
skilling or other strategies.
In the fast food industry in particular, brands have long sought out vulnerable
and low-bargaining power workers for employment in their restaurants, despite not di-
rectly employing them. A major early innnovation of McDonald’s, for example, was
introducing an automated system to replaced skilled chefs with unskilled, younger
workers. However, McDonald’s early attempts at franchising failed due to the lack
of vertical control. Under CEO Ray Kroc in the 1960s McDonald’s harnessed the
power of vertical restraints to expand its fordist system “tailored for unskilled labor”
throughout the U.S. (Love 1995, 136). Royle (1999) documents how the same firm,
McDonald’s, deliberately “recruits an acquiescent workforce” internationally, favor-
ing cheap, unskilled and (what McDonald’s perceives as) more pliable labor. In the
US, franchisors have long sought young part-time workers in particular. The main
franchise lobby group in fact pushed hard for a youth sub-minimum wage in the 1970s
(International Franchise Association 1979, 112). Under what I will call the “target-
ing a vulnerable workforce” theory of vertical restraints, indicators of low worker
bargaining power should be associated with the imposition of vertical restraints.
3.2 Data
This paper uses a unique data set created from 530 franchise contracts to exam-
ine which franchisor and industry characteristics predict the likelihood of imposing
vertical restraints. The Federal Trade Commission requires franchisors to furnish
prospective franchisees with a Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD), which con-
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tains a copy of the contract and detailed information about the franchisor. Some
states require franchisors to register with the state and file a copy of their FDD. I
acquired all FDDs filed in the State of Wisconsin in 2016 (containing 2015 data), and
hand-collected a data set from the FDDs for all 530 franchisors with more than 80
outlets nationwide. I use the cutoff of 80 to ensure my data set includes only ma-
ture large chains, excluding fly-by-night chains, small local chains and other marginal
operators. The sample contains all of the national U.S. chains and some regional
chains as well: the mean franchisor in my data set operates in thirty-seven states and
territories.
To analyze what factors are associated with the decision to impose vertical re-
straints, I collected variables representing six common vertical restraints, a set of
variables representing characteristics of each franchisor, and industry-level workforce
traits. The vertical restraints are as follows. The first is the proportion of the fran-
chisee’s ongoing purchases that must be made from sources of supply restricted by
the franchisor. The other five are dummy variables (Y=1) indicating the presence
or absence of specific contract terms: whether franchisor approval is required for the
site of the business, whether the franchisor prohibits the sale of unapproved products
or services, whether the franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation, whether the
franchisor sets maximum or minimum prices, and, following Krueger and Ashenfelter,
whether the franchisor imposes a no-poaching clause.
I collect franchisor characteristics from the FDDs to examine whether agency costs
predict the imposition of vertical restraints. Franchisors with more valuable brands
have higher externalities and would be expected to impose more vertical restraints to
constrain franchisee moral hazard and free-riding. The number of outlets (Lafontaine
1992; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; Combs et al. 2009), length of the franchisee
training program (Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005), and age of
the brand (Lafontaine 1992; Combs et al. 2009) typically proxy for brand value in
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the franchising literature. I also include a financial variable, the total assets of the
franchisor, to capture brand value. Monitoring costs are another type of agency costs.
Number of states with outlets captures the geographical dimension of monitoring
costs, as more dispered production networks are more difficult to surveil (Lafontaine
1992; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005). The size of the average initial franchisee
investment, measuring outlet size and complexity, captures another dimension of
monitoring costs (Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Shaw 2005; Combs et al. 2009).
Lafontaine (1992) uses proportion of outlets discontinued at the sector level as a
measure of risk (variance of output). I use proportion of discontinued outlets (or the
outlet turnover rate) at the franchisor level.
Finally, to examine whether workforce traits are associated with the decision to
impose vertical restraints, I collected industry-level average hourly wage data for
2015 from the Current Employment Statistics survey and 2015 industry-level average
employee turnover (new hire rate, or proportion of workers with less than one year
of tenure), age and education (years of schooling) data from the Current Popula-
tion Survey, and merged these industry-level data with the data from the franchise
contracts.
Descriptive statistics for the vertical restraints are presented in Table 3.1, and
descriptive statistics for franchisor characteristics in Table 3.2. It is apparent that two
of the vertical restraints, site selection and product approval, are imposed by nearly
all franchisors and do not vary much at all. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 list the industry mean
value of each workforce characteristic in each CPS and CES industry in the data set.
These tables show that franchisors in the sample are concentrated in a few industries,
with a long tail of industries with only one or two franchisors.
The data contain six different vertical restraints, multiple measures of brand value
and monitoring costs, and multiple measures of workforce traits that all represent
low-bargaining power workers. Therefore multicollinearity among variables is likely.
51
Tables 3.5-3.7 present correlation matrices for each grouping of variables: vertical
restraints, franchisor characteristics and workforce traits. Table 3.5 displays the cor-
relation matrix for the six vertical restraints. All correlation coefficients but one are
greater than zero, indicating that there is a positive relationship among them, but
the strength of the correlations are relatively weak. Given the weak correlations, it
makes sense to analyze each vertical restraint separately to learn which franchisor
characteristics and workforce traits are associated with each one.
Table 3.6 displays the correlation matrix for franchisor characteristics. The brand
value measures—number of outlets, brand age, training, and assets—are all positively
correlated with each other, but only weakly. The same goes for the monitoring cost
variables. The risk measure (outlet turnover) is essentially orthogonal to the other
franchisor characteristics.
Turning to the worker characteristics in Table 3.7, these are highly collinear with
each other. Workers who are either young or relatively uneducated tend to also have
low tenures at their curent jobs and earn low wages. This makes sense, as a worker
who exhibits any of these traits is likely to have low bargaining power and share the
other traits as well.
3.3 Logit regressions
In the regressions that follow, I explore which variables predict the use of verti-
cal restraints in franchise contracts. The correlation matrices in the previous section
suggest that the workforce traits together represent a latent variable, low bargaining
power. Because of the high collinearity between the workforce traits, I enter them
one by one in separate regressions. The franchisor characteristics, however, do not
exhibit similar tight correlations with each other, and I therefore enter them together.
I estimate the following equation for each of the six dummy variables representing
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vertical restraints.2 Subscripts i vary at the franchisor level and subscripts j vary at
the industry level. Because of the use of industry-level variables, I cluster standard
errors at the 2-digit NAICS industry level.
logit(Pr(V ertical Restrainti = 1)) = β0 + β1ln(Worker Traitj) + β2ln(Outletsi) +
β3Statesi + β4ln(Agei) + β5ln(Trainingi) + β6ln(Investmenti) + β7ln(Assetsi) +
β8ln(Turnoveri)
I take the log of those variables that appear log-normally rather than normally dis-
tributed according to visual inspection of the distributions, adding 0.001 to variables
with zero-valued observations.3
3.3.1 Predictors common to multiple vertical restraints
In this section I study whether there are predictors shared by multiple vertical
restraints. In the next section I will examine each vertical restraint individually
to study if there are variations in predictors depending on the particular vertical
restraint. According to the externality and free-riding explanations for vertical re-
straints, we would expect to see positive signs on the brand value and monitoring cost
coefficients. Under the Prendergast theory, we would expect a negative coefficient on
the outlet turnover variable. Under the “targeting a vulnerable workforce” theory,
we would expect a negative coefficient on the age, education and wage variables and
a positive coefficient on the new hire rate.
2Since the proportion of supplies under restriction is not a bivariate outcome variable, I use OLS
rather than logit for that case.
3While the logit estimator does not rely on a normality assumption, I take the natural log anyway
in order to present the results in the same table with the results from the OLS estimator, which
does depend on a normality assumption. The log transformation should not affect the significance
of the results, although it does of course affect the interpretation of the coefficients. Appendix A.2
contains results for the linear probability model, which yields results with a more straightforward
coefficient interpretation.
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Four separate regression tables, one for each of the four collinear j workforce trait
variables, are presented in Tables 3.8-3.11.4 That makes 24 separate regression equa-
tions. Significance is conservatively reported for a two-tailed test. Looking first to the
agency cost explanations for vertical restraints, we see that the brand value variables
do not always agree with each other. We would expect each to be positively associated
with the imposition of vertical restraints. The length of the franchisor’s training pro-
gram for franchisees is consistently positively and signficantly associated with vertical
restraints, having a strong relationship with all but franchisor site approval. Number
of outlets, meanwhile, is positive and significant (at the one percent level) in two
of six regressions. Brand age and franchisor assets are only significant sporadically
and switch signs depending on the vertical restraint. Turning to monitoring costs,
number of states is consistently negatively associated with vertical restraints, while
average initial franchisee investment flips signs between different vertical restraints. A
clear story according to the agency costs explanations for vertical restraints does not
emerge. This could be because these measures are noisy proxies for the underlying
“brand value” variable. For example, brand age could be capturing life-cycle effects
in addition to brand-value effects.
The risk variable, outlet turnover, is negatively associated with three vertical
restraints: product approval, mandatory hours of operation, and price fixing. While
risk is associated with only half of the vertical restraints, in those cases where it is
the coefficients have the sign predicted by the Prendergast model. The next section
looks at each vertical restraint separately and will take up the question of why risk
is associated with some vertical restraints but not others.
4While logit is an appropriate functional form for a binary dependent variable, it has the drawback
relative to the linear probability model of yielding coefficient magnitudes that are complicated to
interpret. I therefore include linear probability model regressions in Appendix A.2 below.
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Finally, the coefficients on the worker characteristics are almost always of the sign
expected under the “targeting a vulnerable workforce” theory. In only two regres-
sions out of twenty-four are they of the unexpected sign, and in both of those cases
they are not statistically significant at any reasonable significance level. Among the
worker characteristics, age is the most strongly associated with vertical restraints: it
is associated with six of six vertical restraints at the one percent significance level.
Turning to the other workforce characteristics, worker turnover is associated with
four of six vertical restraints at the ten percent level, and wages with three of six.
Education is rarely statistically significant, but this may be due to the low variation
in this explanatory variable: the mean years of schooling is 11.3 years with a standard
deviation of 1.2 years. These results point to the relative youth and inexperience of
the workforce as strongly predictive of the use of vertical restraints, even more so than
their turnover and wage levels. Workforce traits indicative of a vulnerable workforce
are strongly predictive of the likelihood of franchisors imposing vertical restraints.
3.3.2 Differences among vertical restraints
Workforce traits appear to have a consistent relationship across vertical restraints.
The “targeting a vulnerable workforce” explanation for vertical restraints, therefore,
seems to have general applicability. However, workforce characteristics seem to be
paricularly relevant to two restraints: restrictions on hours and on suppliers. Of the
vertical restraints, worker characteristics are most likely to be associated with manda-
tory hours of operation: three of four worker characteristics (all but education) are
significantly associated with mandatory hours of operation at the one percent level.
Three of the four worker characteristics (again, all but education) are significantly
associated with supplier restrictions at the ten percent level, with turnover and age
significant at the one percent level. Franchisors hiring in industries characterized
by inexperienced, high-turnover and low-wage workers tend especially to control the
55
franchisee’s hours of operation and their non-labor inputs more than franchisors in
other industries.
Three of four worker characteristics are associated with no-poaching agreements
at the ten percent level. Worker characteristics are more weakly associated with
product restrictions and price fixing, and site approval is only associated with worker
age. However, the weak relationships of workforce characteristics with product re-
strictions and site approval may simply reflect the extremely low variation in those
variables: ninety percent of franchise agreements contain a product restriction clause,
and eighty-one percent contain a site approval clause (see Table 3.2).
The signs on the franchisor characteristics sometimes flip between positive and
negative depending on the particular restraint, suggesting the agency costs and risk
and incentives theories may apply to different vertical restraints in different ways.
The regressions suggest that measures of brand value do a fair job predicting site
selection, purchase restrictions and (somewhat less strongly) product approval. A
brand value/externalities theory of vertical restraints is less consistent, however, with
the evidence regarding no-poaching agreements, price fixing and hours of operation.
The variables capturing difficulty monitoring indicate that franchisors are less likely
to impose site, purchase, product and hours restrictions when monitoring costs are
high. It could be the case, under rather Prendergastian reasoning, that it is more
profitable to let franchisors make their own decisions when the franchisor has less
knowledge about local conditions.
Finally, the coefficients on the risk variable conform to the Prendergast model.
We would not expect risk to be associated with no-poaching (which has nothing to
do with choice under uncertainty) or site selection (a one-time decision made at the
beginning of the relationship). Franchisors behaving according to the Prendergast
model would be expected to delegate authority more when it comes to managerial
decisions like product offerings, hours of operation and price: they would delegate
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when uncertainty is high, and impose vertical restraints when uncertainty is low.
That is indeed what the results show.
3.4 LASSO regression results
The logit regressions in the previous section are intended as descriptive prediction
exercises rather than causal analyses. Another useful methodology for prediction is
the LASSO model. LASSO models are typically used on large data sets with very
large numbers of predictors, using regularization to prevent overfitting by trading off
a small increase bias for a large decrease in variance. Conventional models overfit
because adding additional regressors tends to mechanically reduce variance even if
the regressors are not truly explanatory. With many regressors included, some of
the regressors will, by chance, fit the realized data and decrease variance even if
they have no association in the true data-generating process. LASSO, an example
of regularization, penalizes the addition of regressors, and so the model will admit
only regressors that substantially explain the outcome well enough to overcome the
penalty for adding additional regressors. Compared to OLS, LASSO changes the
tradeoff between bias (finding a regressor significant when in reality it is not) and
variance (failing to fit the observed data) towards accepting more residual variance
rather than assigning importance to an irrelevant regressor.
While the data in this paper do not present the problem of a large number of
predictors that LASSO models are designed to solve, LASSO’s ability to perform
variable selection nonetheless serves as a useful check on the logit models in the pre-
vious section. Using cross-validation to tune the model parameters, I run six LASSO
models, regressing each vertical restraint on the full set of franchisor characteristics
and workforce traits. As an atheoretical prediction methodology, LASSO more or less
blindly drops variables in groups of highly collinear variables, so too much should not
be read into LASSO’s choice of one variable over another in a group of collinear vari-
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ables. More important is which group is selected by the LASSO procedure—brand
value, monitoring costs, risk, or low worker bargaining power?
Results of the LASSO variable selection exercise are presented in Table 3.12. The
LASSO results largely confirm the logit models in the previous section. Once again,
the brand value measures do not agree with each other, or even with themselves
across vertical restraints. As with logit results, geographic dispersion (number of
states with outlets) tends to be negatively associated with vertical restraints, while
outlet complexity (average initial franchisee investment) flips signs depending on the
restraint.
Once again, Prendergast holds up relatively well. Franchise chains exposed to
higher risk tend to impose vertical restraints on hours and prices, which are the
two vertical restraints most reflective of day-to-day business decisions. However,
product approval, which had been associated with risk in the logit model, is dropped
from the LASSO model. Finally, as in the logit regressions, workforce traits are
widely predictive of vertical restraints. At least one workforce characteristic exhibits
relationships of the expected signs with each vertical restraint, with the exception
of the product approval vertical restraint. When all workforce characteristics are
included together in the LASSO regression, however, the regularization procedure
does not always pick age, the best performer in the logit regressions, from among the
collinear workfroce characteristics.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
The literature offers several explanations for the imposition of vertical restraints
in franchise contracts. Franchisors impose them to constrain franchisee free-riding
and opportunistic behavior (the agency cost theory), to control franchisee decision-
making under conditions of low uncertainty (the Prendergast model), or to fissure
the workplace and induce franchisees to extract high effort levels from the vulnerable
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workforce targeted by the franchisor (the “targeting a vulnerable workforce” theory).
Until now, to my knowledge, no study has specifically examined which factors predict
the likelihood of imposing vertical restraints. This paper contributes to the analysis of
vertical restraint by conducting such a prediction exercise. It finds no clear evidence
in support of the agency cost theory, but some evidence in favor of the Prendergast
model and the targeting a vulnerable workforce theories.
As with Krueger and Ashenfelter’s paper, my results do not show causality in
any statistical sense. Nonetheless, they do uncover, for the first time, an empirical
relationship between workforce characteristics and vertical restraints. It will take
further research, including additional data collection, to more precisely determine the
nature of this connection and the direction of causal arrows. For example, a limitation
of the descriptive, predictive regressions in this paper is the possibility of endogeneity
issues, in particular omitted variables. The relationship between workforce traits and
vertical restraints may be capturing the relationship between omitted industry-level
variables that tend to vary together with the workforce traits. For example, industries
could vary in terms of the intensity and types of regulation affecting them.
These results suggest that franchisors write franchise contracts in anticipation
of the kind of worker they anticipate hiring. In particular, they suggest that in
industries like fast food, they write highly restrictive contracts that are tailored to
a high-turnover, low-skill, low-wage workforce by steering franchisees toward a high-
monitoring, high-effort labor strategy. This strategy uses the incentives of franchisee
residual claimancy combined with vertical restraints to focus franchisee attention
on monitoring and effort extraction. However, this intense monitoring would, in
turn, be likely to reduce the wage premium that must be paid to workers to induce
effort, resulting in even lower wages. But then vertical restraints would not only take
advantage of low wages, but also contribute to causing them, so wages could be on
the left hand side as a dependent variable. Unfortunately, while my data contain
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franchisor-level contract terms and characteristics, they only contain industry-level
worker characteristics. Establishing the impact of vertical restraints on wages requires
franchisor-level wage data, suggesting an avenue for further research.5
Of particular importance in the results is that workplace fissuring and targeting
vulnerable workforce appear to be closely related with vertical restraints. While the
courts initially relaxed antitrust restrictions on vertical restraints on the grounds that
the might lower consumer prices in the context of the high-inflation 1970s, today the
major policy problem is low wages rather than high prices. A reconsideration of the
impact of vertical restraints on workers may be in order.
5A causal analysis might be possible through matched employer-employee data such as the Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics, available with a security clearance from the
Census Bureau, or through proprietary sources like Burning Glass. I am exploring getting such data
for a future paper.
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3.6 Chapter 3 tables
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics, vertical restraints
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
No poach (Y = 1) 529 0.552 0.498 0 1
Site approval (Y = 1) 530 0.819 0.385 0 1
Purchase restrictions (Proportion of total) 498 0.468 0.351 0 1
Product approval (Y = 1) 530 0.908 0.290 0 1
Mandatory hours (Y = 1) 529 0.643 0.480 0 1
Price fixing (Y = 1) 529 0.442 0.497 0 1
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics, franchisor characteristics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Outlets 528 761 1,811 80 27,129
No. states & territories 529 37 11 1 55
Brand age 530 27 18 0 103
Training program (hours) 527 152 182 0 1,360
Franchisee investment (dollars) 523 1,527,062 6,139,976 8,468 76,558,688
Franchisor assets (000s dollars) 520 1,559,183 8,702,563 3 161,184,000
3-yr outlet turnover rate 517 0.20 0.27 0 4.16
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Table 3.3: CPS industries with industry average workforce traits
CPS Industry N Tenure Age Education
Restaurants and Other Food Svcs 147 0.286 31.997 10.272
Traveler Accommodation 39 0.179 41.219 10.922
Construction 34 0.133 42.808 10.581
Other Amusements and Recreation 29 0.198 37.463 11.450
Svcs to Buildings 23 0.156 44.156 9.916
Other Schools, Instruction, and Education Support Svcs 16 0.185 42.383 13.758
Real Estate 16 0.127 48.709 12.549
Automotive Repair and Maintenance 15 0.153 42.291 10.403
Individual and Family Svcs 15 0.176 44.418 13.005
Mgmt, Tech, and Scientific Consulting 13 0.159 45.514 14.389
Nail Salons and Other Personal Care 12 0.127 41.928 11.351
Auto Equipment Rental and Leasing 8 0.167 42.117 11.765
Furniture Stores 8 0.174 43.233 11.707
Printing and Rltd Support 8 0.122 45.521 11.389
Business Support Svcs 7 0.236 39.734 12.124
Employment Svcs 7 0.303 40.223 11.663
Architectural Engineering and Rltd 6 0.134 44.646 14.038
Health and Personal Care Stores 6 0.197 39.324 12.152
Used Merchandise Stores 6 0.217 44.857 10.941
Beauty Salons 5 0.132 41.668 11.403
Landscaping Svcs 5 0.105 39.735 9.661
Travel Arrangements and Reservations 5 0.120 45.838 12.954
Waste Mgmt and Remediation 5 0.138 43.982 10.564
Accounting, Tax Prep, and Bookkeeping 4 0.147 46.205 13.784
Auto Parts and Tire Stores 4 0.165 41.517 10.823
Radio, TV, and Computer Stores 4 0.195 35.683 12.310
Sporting Goods, Camera, and Hobby Stores 4 0.229 37.340 11.889
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Svcs 3 0.167 44.932 9.990
Gasoline Stations 3 0.245 37.799 10.646
Groceries and Rltd Wholesale 3 0.119 42.982 11.120
Insurance Carriers and Rltd 3 0.114 45.263 13.325
Misc Manufacturing 3 0.162 44.686 11.387
Misc Retail Stores 3 0.198 40.204 11.693
Offices of Optometrists 3 0.108 42.702 12.998
Offices of Chiropractors 3 0.138 42.617 14.302
Other Direct Selling Ests 3 0.234 43.055 11.867
Other Health Care Svcs 3 0.162 42.457 13.059
Other Personal Svcs 3 0.190 40.756 11.678
Other Professional Svcs 3 0.123 42.543 13.475
Pharmacies and Drug Stores 3 0.141 39.305 12.701
Specialty Food Stores 3 0.178 39.751 10.806
Child Day Care Svcs 2 0.206 39.094 11.713
Computer Systems Design and Rltd 2 0.171 41.926 14.392
Electronic and Precision Equipment Repair 2 0.139 43.495 12.188
Florists 2 0.103 48.846 10.931
Investigation and Security Svcs 2 0.191 43.600 11.563
Investments 2 0.119 45.010 14.339
Personal and Household Goods Repair and Maintenance 2 0.147 49.523 11.109
Shoe Stores 2 0.318 29.860 11.214
Advertising and Rltd 1 0.193 40.654 13.666
Auto Dealers 1 0.180 42.866 11.402
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Barber Shops 1 0.053 43.703 10.788
Commercial and Industrial Machinery Repair 1 0.158 43.176 10.426
Elementary and Secondary Schools 1 0.107 45.591 14.040
Furniture Wholesale 1 0.117 45.500 11.635
Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir Shops 1 0.193 47.617 12.066
Household Appliance Stores 1 0.085 42.268 11.156
Jewelry, Luggage, and Leather Stores 1 0.166 43.795 12.083
Motor Vehicle Parts Supplies Wholesale 1 0.140 45.847 11.489
Offices of Dentists 1 0.123 42.512 13.381
Offices of Other Health Practitioners 1 0.112 47.701 15.013
Other Admin and Support 1 0.172 43.903 12.353
Other Consumer Goods Rental 1 0.147 39.085 11.217
Outpatient Care Centers 1 0.176 42.390 13.829
Periodical, Book, and Directory Publishers 1 0.117 45.596 14.139
Recreational Vehicle Parks and Camps 1 0.195 38.201 10.990
Specialized Design Svcs 1 0.139 43.930 13.745
Truck Transportation 1 0.165 46.620 10.500
Vending Machine Operators 1 0.250 44.191 10.727
Warehousing and Storage 1 0.186 39.983 10.616
Source: Flood, et al. (2018).
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Table 3.4: CES industries with industry average hourly wages
CES industry N wage
Limited Service Restaurants 78 10.880
Snack and Non-Alcoholic Beverage Bars 40 12.210
Hotels and Motels 39 16.210
Full Service Restaurants 29 13.930
Fitness and Recreational Sports Centers 24 15.980
Education and Health Svcs 17 25.240
Janitorial Svcs 15 13.820
Offices of Real Estate Agents and Brokers 15 26.160
Svcs for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities 14 14.040
Plumbing, Heating, and Air Conditioning Contractors 11 27.540
Administrative Management and General Management Consulting Svcs 10 42.890
Other Personal Care Svcs 10 19.010
Automotive Equipment Rental and Leasing 8 20.090
Printing and Rltd Support Activities 8 22.730
Business Service Centers 7 19.480
Barber Shops and Beauty Salons 6 17.370
Building Inspection Svcs 6 27.640
Used Merchandise Stores 6 13.310
Automotive Mechanical and Electrical Repair 5 20.220
Auto Oil Change Shops and All Other Auto Repair 5 14.680
Landscaping Svcs 5 17.400
Other Building Equipment Contractors 5 28.360
Other Health and Personal Care Stores 5 19.280
Residential Remodelers 5 23.960
Travel Agencies 5 26.310
Accounting and Bookkeeping Svcs 4 31.080
All Other Amusement and Recreation Industries 4 16.170
Automotive Parts and Accessories 4 17.910
Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning 4 17.690
Electronics Stores 4 24.850
Non-Store Retailers 4 25.830
Painting and Wall Covering Contractors 4 22.060
Remediation and Other Waste Svcs 4 25.290
Temporary Help Svcs 4 16.700
Automotive Body, Interior and Glass Repair 3 21.960
Chiropractors 3 22.710
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Svcs 3 12.210
Employment Placement Agencies 3 25.820
Exterminating and Pest Control Services 3 21.940
Finish Carpentry Contractors 3 24.800
Floor Covering Stores 3 21.790
Furniture Stores 3 20.140
Gasoline Stations with Convenience Stores 3 12.530
Grocery and Rltd Products Wholesale Trade 3 22.630
Marketing Consulting Svcs 3 36.560
Offices of Optometrists 3 22.250
Pharmacies and Drug Stores 3 23.160
Sign Manufacturing 3 21.370
Specialty Food Stores 3 14.840
All Other Home Furnishings Stores 2 16.750
Child Day Care Svcs 2 14.070
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Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Carriers 2 33.780
Electronic Equipment Repair and Maintenance 2 25.800
Florists 2 12.820
General Automotive Repair 2 20.210
Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores 2 13.580
Household Goods Repair and Maintenance 2 18.500
Investment Advice 2 48.670
Medical Laboratories 2 27.570
Nail Salons 2 12.650
Other Building Finishing Contractors 2 26.260
Other Computer Related Svcs 2 40.580
Pet and Pet Supplies Stores 2 17.190
Pet Care Svcs 2 15.280
Photo Graphic Svcs 2 17.580
Shoe Stores 2 17.110
Sporting Good Stores 2 16.420
All Other Miscellaneous Ambulatory Health Care Svcs 1 27.950
All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers 1 17.630
All Other Personal Svcs 1 15.650
All Other Specialty Trade Contractors 1 25.060
Amusement Parks and Arcades 1 13.120
Claims Adjusting 1 32.320
Commercial Machinery Repair and Maintenance 1 25.390
Cosmetics Stores 1 16.930
Direct Mail Advertising 1 25.870
Electrical Contractors and Other Wiring Installation Contractors 1 28.940
Free Standing Ambulatory Surgical and Emergency Centers 1 31.910
Furniture and Furnishings Wholesale Trade 1 24.790
General Rental Centers 1 23.340
Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir Stores 1 14.310
Glass and Glazing Contractors 1 25.330
Household Appliance Stores 1 18.770
Interior Design Svcs 1 29.290
Jewelry, Luggage and Leather Goods Stores 1 19.700
Lessors of Mini Warehouses and Self Storage 1 18.040
Misc Professional and Technical Svcs 1 31
Motor Vehicle Supplies and New Parts Merchant Wholesalers 1 24.200
Offices of Dentists 1 30.170
Offices of Real Estate Appraisers 1 26.160
Offices of Specialty Therapists 1 27.400
Other Individual and Family Svcs 1 19.980
Other Svcs to Buildings and Dwellings 1 18.560
Other Support Svcs 1 24.260
Periodical Publishers 1 37.240
RV Parks and Recreational Camps 1 15.270
Security and Amored Car Svcs 1 14.270
Security Systems Svcs 1 24.650
Siding Contractors 1 22.820
Used Car Dealers 1 20.560
Used Household and Office Goods Moving 1 20.020
Waste Collection 1 21.200
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018).
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Table 3.7. Correlation matrix, industry workforce traits
Wage New hire rate Age Education
Wage 1 -0.692 0.688 0.572
New hire rate -0.692 1 -0.896 -0.393
Age 0.688 -0.896 1 0.515
Education 0.572 -0.393 0.515 1
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Table 3.8. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker age, franchisor
characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg worker age) −3.288∗∗∗ −3.963∗∗∗ −1.152∗∗∗ −1.929∗∗∗ −2.508∗∗∗ −2.491∗∗∗
(0.913) (1.533) (0.153) (0.455) (0.607) (0.637)
ln(Outlets) −0.060 0.480∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.279∗ 0.193 −0.056
(0.043) (0.179) (0.012) (0.169) (0.211) (0.146)
No. states −0.003 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ 0.006
(0.007) (0.013) (0.001) (0.018) (0.015) (0.010)
ln(Brand age) −0.127 −0.236 0.030∗∗∗ −0.802∗ −0.256 −0.758∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.275) (0.011) (0.429) (0.218) (0.169)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.246∗∗∗ 0.165 0.023∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.107) (0.008) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.205 0.856∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.499∗∗∗ 0.152 0.194∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.217) (0.019) (0.119) (0.153) (0.047)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.109∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.003 0.081 0.023 0.093∗
(0.026) (0.074) (0.005) (0.070) (0.046) (0.050)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.054 −0.124 0.002 −0.314∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.145) (0.019) (0.092) (0.105) (0.056)
Constant 15.700∗∗∗ 3.207 4.770∗∗∗ 16.376∗∗∗ 7.362∗∗∗ 6.549∗∗
(5.044) (8.434) (0.732) (2.614) (2.782) (2.927)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.170 0.390 0.288 0.307 0.193 0.201
χ2 (df = 8) 67.283∗∗∗ 132.688∗∗∗ 159.248∗∗∗ 72.129∗∗∗ 75.017∗∗∗ 81.171∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Avg worker age is measured in years. It varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee
training = length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet
turnover = the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table 3.9. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker turnover, fran-
chisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(New hire rate) 0.741 0.909 0.390∗∗∗ 0.739∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 0.588∗
(0.579) (0.706) (0.120) (0.413) (0.355) (0.352)
ln(Outlets) 0.023 0.537∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.311∗ 0.203 0.006
(0.045) (0.192) (0.017) (0.172) (0.214) (0.150)
No. states −0.010 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ 0.0002
(0.008) (0.015) (0.001) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011)
ln(Brand age) −0.144 −0.253 0.024∗∗ −0.811∗ −0.273 −0.762∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.268) (0.010) (0.432) (0.221) (0.172)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.283∗∗ 0.153 0.023∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.234∗∗
(0.121) (0.105) (0.010) (0.077) (0.080) (0.095)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.151 0.943∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.492∗∗∗ 0.149 0.232∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.192) (0.026) (0.123) (0.151) (0.043)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.116∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.002 0.077 0.026 0.085
(0.028) (0.071) (0.005) (0.070) (0.045) (0.054)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.040 −0.103 0.003 −0.311∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.140) (0.018) (0.104) (0.096) (0.058)
Constant 3.942 −10.936∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗ 10.453∗∗∗ 0.362 −2.250
(3.113) (4.131) (0.491) (1.792) (1.235) (1.464)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.143 0.378 0.233 0.306 0.202 0.187
χ2 (df = 8) 56.110∗∗∗ 128.053∗∗∗ 124.429∗∗∗ 71.859∗∗∗ 78.773∗∗∗ 74.981∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
New hire rate = proportion of workers with less than 1 yr tenure. It varies at the industry level, all other variables
at the franchisor level. Franchisee training = length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average
franchisee initial investment, Outlet turnover = the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over
the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table 3.10. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average hourly wage, franchisor
characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg hourly wage) −0.679∗ −0.619 −0.271∗ −0.143 −1.292∗∗∗ −0.518
(0.375) (0.751) (0.146) (0.357) (0.329) (0.433)
ln(Outlets) 0.011 0.508∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.167 −0.0005
(0.061) (0.171) (0.017) (0.170) (0.203) (0.154)
No. states −0.009 −0.047∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ 0.001
(0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
ln(Brand age) −0.147 −0.262 0.026∗∗ −0.791∗ −0.281 −0.764∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.262) (0.011) (0.444) (0.232) (0.180)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.307∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.256∗∗
(0.151) (0.096) (0.012) (0.077) (0.092) (0.100)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.166 0.942∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.475∗∗∗ 0.108 0.222∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.184) (0.030) (0.119) (0.154) (0.057)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.114∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.002 0.070 0.034 0.086
(0.027) (0.076) (0.006) (0.075) (0.053) (0.054)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.026 −0.088 0.011 −0.293∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.152) (0.017) (0.092) (0.110) (0.054)
Constant 4.785 −10.617∗∗∗ 1.139 9.302∗∗∗ 2.497∗ −1.684
(3.004) (4.038) (0.753) (1.944) (1.421) (2.353)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.142 0.376 0.186 0.301 0.209 0.186
χ2 (df = 8) 55.906∗∗∗ 127.114∗∗∗ 96.415∗∗∗ 70.756∗∗∗ 81.679∗∗∗ 74.604∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average hourly wage varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee training =
length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet turnover =
the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table 3.11. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker education,
franchisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg years schooling) −1.965∗ 0.280 −0.664 0.331 −0.549 −1.266
(1.179) (2.654) (0.443) (1.370) (2.025) (1.209)
ln(Outlets) 0.053 0.567∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.285 0.035
(0.073) (0.177) (0.023) (0.153) (0.236) (0.133)
No. states −0.011 −0.051∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010)
ln(Brand age) −0.160 −0.242 0.024∗∗ −0.787∗ −0.265 −0.780∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.250) (0.011) (0.447) (0.226) (0.178)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.314∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.095) (0.014) (0.081) (0.105) (0.097)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.148 1.033∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.460∗∗∗ 0.224 0.242∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.146) (0.031) (0.110) (0.178) (0.049)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.125∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ −0.002 0.067 0.007 0.079
(0.026) (0.072) (0.006) (0.074) (0.050) (0.053)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.024 −0.077 0.012 −0.291∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.154) (0.016) (0.095) (0.087) (0.052)
Constant 7.318 −14.346∗∗ 1.824 7.872∗∗ −1.595 −0.402
(4.655) (6.891) (1.402) (3.303) (5.482) (3.639)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.141 0.370 0.164 0.301 0.174 0.184
χ2 (df = 8) 55.275∗∗∗ 125.059∗∗∗ 84.181∗∗∗ 70.732∗∗∗ 66.972∗∗∗ 73.602∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average years of schooling varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee training
= length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet turnover
= the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table 3.12. LASSO model variable selection
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
Outlets 0 0 0 0 + 0
States - 0 0 - - 0
Brand age - 0 0 - - -
Franchisee training + + + 0 + 0
Franchisee investment - 0 - - + +
Franchisor assets - 0 0 0 + +
Outlet turnover 0 0 0 0 - -
NewHireRate 0 0 0 0 + 0
Wage 0 - 0 0 - 0
Age - - - 0 0 -
Education 0 0 0 0 - 0
0 indicates a variable was dropped by LASSO regularization. + or - indicate the sign
of the variables that were selected by LASSO regularization.
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APPENDIX
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
A.1 Krueger and Ashenfelter covariates
The main results from this paper are robust across four different, but related, ex-
planatory variables: industry-level worker age, turnover, wage, and education. How-
ever, despite this robustness, the results could still be due to misspecification of the
regression model. In particular, I could have chosen the wrong franchisor character-
istics as controls. As discussed in the paper, I used the standard controls for agency
problems and risk used in the existing franchising literature, as well as a measure of
franchisor wealth. Krueger and Ashenfelter went a different route. Since their model
was focused more narrowly on franchise employer monopsony rather than broadly on
vertical restraints, their covariates were brand age, percent of employees in the indus-
try employed at franchise establishments, and franchisor market share (measured as
share of outlets). The first is also in my regression, but the last two are not.
Tables 7-10 present results for regressions using Krueger and Ashenfelter’s co-
variates rather than my own. The results are quite similar to mine as presented in
Tables 3-6. The point estimates tend to be more precise in my specification, while
the magnitudes tend to be larger in this alternative, Krueger and Ashenfelter-derived
specification. The results of this robustness check reinforce the conclusions drawn in
the preceding chapter.
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Table A.1. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker age, covariates
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Worker age) −5.985∗∗∗ −5.336∗∗∗ −1.353∗∗∗ −4.253 −2.357∗∗∗ −2.612
(1.927) (0.972) (0.155) (3.092) (0.800) (1.738)
Brand age −0.013∗∗ 0.003 0.001 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Pct industry franchised −1.850∗ 4.642∗∗∗ 0.037 −0.691 2.162∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗
(1.014) (1.384) (0.120) (2.040) (1.073) (0.453)
Market share (outlets) 2.072 1.319 0.270 0.962 3.379∗∗ 2.913∗∗
(1.476) (2.431) (0.185) (0.865) (1.430) (1.363)
Constant 22.821∗∗∗ 20.683∗∗∗ 5.382∗∗∗ 18.776 9.073∗∗∗ 9.747
(7.030) (3.611) (0.586) (11.539) (2.788) (6.518)
Observations 461 462 433 462 461 461
R2 0.127 0.220 0.309 0.074 0.118 0.118
χ2 (df = 4) 45.951∗∗∗ 61.851∗∗∗ 160.208∗∗∗ 15.981∗∗∗ 40.392∗∗∗ 42.540∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average worker age and pct industry franchised (share of employment) vary at the industry level, all other variables
at the franchisor level.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.2. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker turnover, co-
variates
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(New hire rate) 1.860 1.193∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 1.756 1.323∗∗∗ 0.618
(1.138) (0.613) (0.160) (1.154) (0.369) (0.441)
Brand age −0.013∗∗ 0.003 0.0005 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
Pct industry franchised −1.097 5.086∗∗∗ 0.184 −0.603 1.938∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗
(1.134) (1.410) (0.160) (1.810) (0.873) (0.312)
Market share (outlets) 1.655 1.451 0.187 1.196 3.905∗∗ 2.588∗∗
(1.369) (2.695) (0.133) (1.051) (1.542) (1.229)
Constant 3.804∗∗ 2.904∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 6.094∗∗∗ 2.690∗∗∗ 1.094
(1.909) (1.125) (0.296) (2.064) (0.576) (0.840)
Observations 461 462 433 462 461 461
R2 0.075 0.190 0.237 0.072 0.130 0.102
χ2 (df = 4) 26.678∗∗∗ 52.959∗∗∗ 116.870∗∗∗ 15.638∗∗∗ 44.705∗∗∗ 36.560∗∗∗
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
New hire rate and pct industry franchised (share of employment) vary at the industry level, all other variables at the
franchisor level.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.3. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average hourly wage, covariates
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg hourly wage) −2.074∗∗ −0.774 −0.406∗∗ −1.397 −0.770 −0.772
(0.992) (0.643) (0.203) (0.968) (0.654) (0.588)
Brand age −0.012∗∗ 0.003 0.001 −0.024∗∗ −0.007 −0.026∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Pct industry franchised −1.336 5.376∗∗∗ 0.208 −0.326 2.360∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(1.207) (1.470) (0.205) (1.573) (1.253) (0.486)
Market share (outlets) 2.016 1.097 0.223 1.007 3.349∗∗ 2.718∗∗
(1.565) (2.619) (0.200) (0.973) (1.406) (1.353)
Constant 6.582∗∗ 3.011 1.529∗∗ 6.979∗∗ 2.547 2.268
(2.841) (1.945) (0.621) (2.759) (1.907) (1.804)
Observations 461 462 433 462 461 461
R2 0.075 0.179 0.200 0.058 0.109 0.103
χ2 (df = 4) 26.597∗∗∗ 49.724∗∗∗ 96.458∗∗∗ 12.494∗∗ 37.131∗∗∗ 37.082∗∗∗
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average hourly wage and pct industry franchised (share of employment) vary at the industry level, all other variables
at the franchisor level.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.4. Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker education, co-
variates
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
logistic logistic OLS logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Years of schooling) −3.189∗ −1.176 −0.880∗ −1.546 1.545 −2.723∗∗
(1.904) (2.700) (0.452) (2.457) (1.243) (1.383)
Brand age −0.012∗∗ 0.003 0.0003 −0.023∗∗ −0.005 −0.027∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Pct industry franchised (employment) 0.075 6.050∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.775 3.262∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗
(0.576) (1.349) (0.131) (0.934) (0.891) (0.365)
Market share (outlets) 1.003 0.728 0.083 0.323 2.344 2.583∗∗
(1.547) (2.989) (0.158) (0.999) (1.523) (1.112)
Constant 8.152∗ 3.548 2.465∗∗ 6.524 −3.541 6.620∗
(4.534) (6.612) (1.103) (5.841) (3.022) (3.379)
Observations 461 462 433 462 461 461
R2 0.033 0.175 0.177 0.043 0.105 0.109
χ2 (df = 4) 11.528∗∗ 48.488∗∗∗ 84.430∗∗∗ 9.220∗ 35.784∗∗∗ 39.094∗∗∗
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average years of schooling and pct industry franchised (share of employment) vary at the industry level, all other
variables at the franchisor level.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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A.2 Linear Probability Model
Tables 11-15 present results for linear probability model (LPM) regressions using
the covariates from the main regressions in the paper. The results are similar to those
in the logit and LASSO regressions. An advantage of LPM over logit is it allows a
more intuitive interpretation of regression results. From Table 17, for example, a
ten percent decrease in the industry average age of workers is associated with a seven
percentage point increase in the likelihood of the chain imposing a no-poaching clause,
holding other variables in the model constant. This is a plausible magnitude, and the
other point estimates are of similar magnitudes.
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Table A.5. LPM: Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker age, fran-
chisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg worker age) −0.765∗∗∗ −0.341∗ −1.152∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.588∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.187) (0.153) (0.024) (0.126) (0.149)
ln(Outlets) −0.016∗ 0.040∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.017 0.035 −0.015
(0.009) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.039) (0.028)
No. states −0.001 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(Brand age) −0.024 −0.031 0.030∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.123∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.032) (0.036)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.020 0.023∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.045 0.065∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.031 0.037∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.023) (0.019) (0.007) (0.028) (0.013)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.019∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.013 −0.006 0.002 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011)
Constant 4.149∗∗∗ 1.006 4.770∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗ 1.856∗∗∗ 2.123∗∗∗
(1.073) (0.980) (0.732) (0.153) (0.561) (0.691)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.125 0.211 0.288 0.209 0.138 0.143
χ2 (df = 8) 66.604∗∗∗ 118.212∗∗∗ 159.248∗∗∗ 116.811∗∗∗ 73.761∗∗∗ 77.039∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Avg worker age is measured in years. It varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee
training = length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet
turnover = the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.6. LPM: Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker turnover,
franchisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(New hire rate) 0.188 0.093 0.390∗∗∗ 0.028 0.245∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗
(0.137) (0.107) (0.120) (0.020) (0.082) (0.074)
ln(Outlets) 0.003 0.048∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.018 0.037 −0.001
(0.011) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.039) (0.029)
No. states −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(Brand age) −0.026 −0.032 0.024∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.124∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.033) (0.035)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.021 0.023∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.032 0.070∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.030 0.047∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.025) (0.026) (0.006) (0.027) (0.011)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.025∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.011 −0.006 0.003 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011)
Constant 1.473∗∗ −0.160 1.044∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗ 0.084
(0.702) (0.554) (0.491) (0.100) (0.252) (0.295)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.102 0.204 0.233 0.209 0.145 0.131
χ2 (df = 8) 53.848∗∗∗ 113.896∗∗∗ 124.429∗∗∗ 116.719∗∗∗ 77.890∗∗∗ 69.708∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
New hire rate = proportion of workers with less than 1 yr tenure. It varies at the industry level, all other variables
at the franchisor level. Franchisee training = length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average
franchisee initial investment, Outlet turnover = the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over
the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.7. LPM: Vertical restraints regressed on industry average hourly wage,
franchisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg hourly wage) −0.164∗ −0.108 −0.271∗ −0.009 −0.270∗∗∗ −0.123
(0.089) (0.115) (0.146) (0.018) (0.065) (0.094)
ln(Outlets) 0.001 0.044∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.029 −0.002
(0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.011) (0.036) (0.030)
No. states −0.002 −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Brand age) −0.026 −0.032 0.026∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.051 −0.124∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.011) (0.014) (0.035) (0.036)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.021 0.031∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.035 0.066∗∗ −0.017 −0.046∗∗∗ 0.022 0.045∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.028) (0.030) (0.007) (0.026) (0.014)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.018
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.008 −0.004 0.011 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.004) (0.015) (0.010)
Constant 1.657∗∗ 0.044 1.139 1.353∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 0.193
(0.688) (0.690) (0.753) (0.137) (0.243) (0.492)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.101 0.206 0.186 0.208 0.152 0.129
χ2 (df = 8) 52.914∗∗∗ 115.358∗∗∗ 96.415∗∗∗ 116.265∗∗∗ 82.238∗∗∗ 68.617∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average hourly wage varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee training =
length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet turnover =
the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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Table A.8. LPM: Vertical restraints regressed on industry average worker education,
franchisor characteristics
Dependent variable:
No-poach Site Purchases Product Hours Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Avg years schooling) −0.467 −0.065 −0.664 0.013 −0.125 −0.261
(0.284) (0.487) (0.443) (0.050) (0.456) (0.264)
ln(Outlets) 0.010 0.054∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.054 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.011) (0.042) (0.025)
No. states −0.003 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Brand age) −0.028 −0.031 0.024∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.124∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014) (0.034) (0.037)
ln(Franchisee training) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007)
ln(Franchisee investment) −0.030 0.075∗∗ −0.008 −0.045∗∗∗ 0.044 0.051∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.029) (0.031) (0.006) (0.033) (0.012)
ln(Franchisor assets (000s)) −0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗ −0.002 0.002 0.001 0.016
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012)
ln(Outlet turnover) −0.007 −0.003 0.012 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010)
Constant 2.250∗∗ −0.238 1.824 1.278∗∗∗ 0.246 0.391
(1.094) (1.493) (1.402) (0.148) (1.230) (0.786)
Observations 498 499 469 499 498 498
R2 0.099 0.199 0.164 0.208 0.124 0.126
χ2 (df = 8) 51.939∗∗∗ 111.002∗∗∗ 84.181∗∗∗ 116.220∗∗∗ 66.170∗∗∗ 66.954∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dep vars = (L to R), franchisee prohibited from hiring workers from other franchisees (Y = 1), franchisor site approval
required (Y = 1), the proportion of franchisee operating purchases from restricted sources, franchisee can only sell
approved products (Y = 1), franchisor sets mandatory hours of operation (Y = 1), franchisor sets max or min resale
price maintenance (Y = 1).
Average worker years of schooling varies at the industry level, all other variables at the franchisor level. Franchisee
training = length of training program (hours), Franchisee investment = average franchisee initial investment, Outlet
turnover = the proportion of system outlets that closed or changed hands over the last three years.
Std. errors clustered at the two-digit NAICS industry level.
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